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Thesis purpose:   
The boycott of Arla in the Middle East, stresses a new issue of global corporate brand management. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is motivated by the case of Arla and the lack of branding theories 
which can explain this recent phenomenon.   
Due to the lack of brand literature regarding this specific case, we seek to develop an understanding of 
this very specific issue. By addressing central elements and developments of the crisis, we want to 
engage in a creative learning experience, which aims to apply, adapt and evaluate known theories 
related to such crisis. This is done from a corporate branding perspective in order to illustrate the 
complexities which global brands are facing. The study does not seek to give any definitive or 
unambiguous answers regarding such specific crisis situation, but rather develop an understanding for 
how such crisis can come about and stress a conscious approach for addressing and acting under such 
corporate brand threat. It is the purpose that this should give an insight to the complexity of such 
abnormal brand situation. Further, it is essential, in the case of Arla, to address the issue of how 
corporations can or should act in a situation where their perceived image, to a larger extent is 
evaluated and given meaning to by infighting external stakeholders.  
More specifically we intend to develop an understanding of how corporations can act before, up to and 
under a surrogate boycott and finally how the corporate brand is influenced under such circumstances. 
Based on four questions, we seek to develop an understanding of this crisis and engage in a learning 
experience.  
 
How has Arla’s corporate brand been influenced under the Muhammad crisis? 
 
How should Arla, from the initiation of this conflict, as a global brand had acted up to the boycott in 
February 2006? 
 
Evaluate Arla’s proposed advertising campaign in the Middle East, and argue whether or not it 
should be conducted? 
 
With respect to the corporate brand, discuss how Arla should act internationally in order to avoid 
future similar situations? 
 
Methodology:  
To fulfil the purpose we have created a case from which a case study has been conducted. The case 
and case study centres around Arla Foods and their role in the Muhammad crisis  
 
Theoretical perspective:  
Branding, corporate branding, corporate social responsibility, crisis, boycott. 
 
 
Empirical data:  
Document studies have been conducted. All the data used is extracted from public newspapers and 
Internet websites to find data concerning Arla Foods and the Muhammad crisis in general.  
 
Conclusion:  
Surrogate boycotts are highly threatening for corporations in terms of both economical cost and image 
damage. All corporations are due to our globalized environment and increased stakeholder 
fragmentation gradually more risking to become victims of surrogate boycotts, which of nature is hard 
if not impossible to predict and prevent. Corporations are generally recommended to build clear and 
strong corporate identities, which should be reflected in their most important stakeholders, as this will 
secure minimum damage on the corporate image. 
Even a surrogate boycott situation can have positive effects on corporations, especially in terms of 
image, as such situation increases the brand involvement and thereby make it possible for corporations 
to connect with important stakeholders on an emotional level.  
Dear Reader 
 
This is a reader manual. By creating a case based on the events of Arla Foods in respect to the 
recent Muhammad crisis, we have decided to take an alternative approach to our master thesis. 
Therefore, we believe that this manual is appropriate to get the full picture and most out of this 
thesis, as the structure is different from traditional master theses.  
 
Our work is divided up into two independent parts. Part one consists of a case with attached 
appendices. This case is aimed at students and managers interested in corporate branding in 
complex environments and situations. It is intended to motivate reflections and thereby learnings by 
encouraging the reader to address the questions presented in the case introduction. In order to secure 
good reflection and learning outcomes we recommend that the case will either encourage a group 
discussion or work as an individual examination and learning tool. 
 
Part two, is our academic section, where we introduce and motivate our purpose and present our 
methodically reasoning and approach and thereby try to make sense of the Muhammad crisis. It 
shall be seen as a complimenting work to part one, as the purpose is to address the questions in the 
case, and through discussion and argumentation present our findings and recommendations. In other 
words, our aim with part two is to address and answer the questions of the case study presented in 
part one. However, it is essential to stress that there is no such thing as a right answer to this case 
study, rather, it is about to make sense of the presented events and facts, and through argumentation 
come to a conclusion. 
 
Finally, as an extra feature, we have created a CD, which is intended as a helping tool for lectures. 
The CD contains events and facts which occurred in the Muhammad case. It is intended to work as 
a complimenting tool for presentations and group discussions or independently as a condensed form 
of learning experience.  
 
We wish you, a pleasant and a worth-while experience time studying our case study and 
contributions, which is intended to shed insight into the very unique, complex and interesting case 
of Arla Foods in the Muhammad crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Best regards 
 
 
 
 
Thure Tornbo Baastrup    Jan Bo Rollmann Madsen  
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Thure Tornbo Baastrup and Jan Bo Rollmann Madsen prepared this case for students and managers to get an insight 
and understanding of how this specific case, which concerns highly abnormal circumstances, in respect to 
communication, globalisation and cultural fragmentation seen from a branding perspective. The case creates the basis 
of a group discussions, however, it is besides highly suitable for individual reflection and examinations. 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Thure Tornbo Baastrup and Jan Bo Rollmann Madsen and fellows of Lund University, Sweden. 
No part of this is permitted to be copied, stored in a retrieval system, reproduced or transmitted in any form, without the 
permission of the authors or the school of Lund University. 
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Introduction 
 
You have as a brand consultant been hired by Arla Foods to help them with the Muhammad crisis. The date 
is the 16th of March 2006, and although the Muhammad crisis has been on since the debate started in October 
2005, it is at this moment, where the boycott effectively has been maintained for approximately two month 
and no indications of improvement is to be found, that the board of directors need your expertise. They feel 
helpless trapped in an unusual situation, which economically is highly expensive and concern about their 
corporate image is increasing. Hence, your job will be to analyse and explain How Arla’s corporate has 
brand been influenced under the Muhammad crisis?, and furthermore How should Arla, from the initiation of 
this conflict, as a global brand had acted up to the boycott in February 2006? In relation to this, Arla Foods 
communication department has created an ad, which is meant to be published in a few days in the Middle 
East (See Appendix 1). They want you to look at it before they decide to publish it, in order to make sure that 
it will be received as intended, why you are expected to analyze possible consequences. In other words 
Evaluate Arla Foods proposed advertising campaign in the Middle East, and argue whether or not it should 
be conducted? Finally, as Arla Foods are determined not to be a victim in such crisis again, you are asked, 
With respect to the corporate brand, to discuss how Arla Foods should act internationally in order to avoid 
future similar situations? 
 
Arla Foods 
 
Arla Foods (Arla) was established in 2000 by the merger of the Danish dairy company MD Foods and the 
Swedish dairy company Arla. Arla produces and distributes milk based products. The organisation is owned 
by approximately 10.600 co-operative milk producers in Denmark and Sweden, and is today the second 
largest dairy organisation in Europe. The largest market is Great Britain which accounts for 33 per cent of 
the total turn over. The second largest market is Sweden where the market represents 22 per cent of the turn 
over, followed by Denmark with 19 per cent. Arla is further exporting to other markets in Europe, North 
America, Middle East and China. (See appendix 2).  
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Arla's vision is to become Europe’s leading dairy organisation. The goal is to pay the highest possible price 
to the co-operatives for their milk, and this shall be done by becoming the leading organisation in Europe and 
thereby improve their bargaining position towards other primary stakeholders. Aside from focusing on the 
welfare of the co-operatives, it is Arla’s intention to satisfy the needs of the consumers by offering inspiring, 
secure and healthy dairy products. Arla is conscious about the fact, that if they intend to pay the highest price 
to the co-operatives and become market leader in Europe, they have to put the consumer in focus. Arla’s 
mission statement is: “…to provide modern consumers with milk-based products that create inspiration, 
confidence and well-being.”   
 
Arla intent is to create security and wellbeing, which should be done by offering tasty and healthy products. 
The consumers have to be convinced that Arla through out the whole value chain are concerned with the use 
of resources, environment, wellbeing of animals and ethics. This is an important part of the image 
communication and how Arla would like to be perceived by the consumers.  
 
Market environment 
Arla is increasingly facing competition on the main markets. As a way to improve Arla’s competitive 
position and protect them from the discount competitors, Arla wants to improve their brands. Especially, 
they intent to strengthen their global corporate brand, which requires heavy marketing investments in certain 
selected markets. As part of this brand vision they want “To become the world leader in value-creation 
within the dairy sector.” In doing so, this among others involves becoming: 
• Northern Europe’s preferred dairy group among consumers, customers and milk producers  
• Northern Europe’s market leader within all types of dairy products with a broad range, strong brands 
and a high degree of consumer confidence  
Finally as part of this vision, Arla want to build a stronger corporate brand in Western Europe. This brand 
building should be based on an internationalization of Arla’s Scandinavian values. They state that in Western 
Europe, outside Denmark, Sweden and UK, the Arla brand does not have any such meaning. 
 
Further strategic initiatives are made to expand outside the main markets, due to the saturated market 
conditions. These markets are primarily Northern America, Eastern Europe, Russia and the Middle East. In 
particular investments to expand and grow are made in the Middle East. 
 
An additional motive for Arla to expand in foreign markets is due to their poor image in primarily the Danish 
market where they are accused of using their dominating position on the market. Arla are therefore 
announcing that they intend to grow primarily outside their home markets. 
 
Arla’s image has the last few years suffered substantially and two third of the Danish consumers are stated to 
have a negative perceived image of Arla. Therefore one of the main contemporary initiatives for Arla is to 
improve its image in Denmark rather than increasing market shares. The report “our responsibility” is clear 
attempt of this. It among other states that: “We shall have efficient procedures for handling complaints from 
consumers and customers with the aim of resolving disputes within a reasonable period of time and in a 
reliable manner.” and ”We shall provide our customers with adequate and relevant information about our 
company, our products and our production processes.” 
Arla goes further than that and stte that they shall maintain good, respectfull and constructive sommunity 
relations. They among other want to do this by creating ”...permanent relations with the local community, 
based on respect, responsibility, dialogue and realistic expectations.”   
The bad image of Arla among the Danish consumers, have developed into a situation where consumers 
increasingly are preferring products from competing dairies as an act of dissatisfaction. In order to create a 
more positive image, as Arla e.g. is experiencing in Sweden, they want to listen more to the consumers and 
thereby try to position them selves less dominant.  
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The Muhammad Crisis 
 
30th September 2005 Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten posts 12 satirical drawings of the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad. This was part of a Danish debate, based on writer Kåre Bluitgen’s difficulties in finding 
illustrators to a book on the prophet Muhammad’s life. In fear of violence several illustrators refused to 
contribute to Bluitgen’s book. This led Jyllands-Posten to print 12 satirical drawings of the prophet, with 
their proclamation to maintain the freedom of speech. This resulted in a critical conflict, where Islamic 
countries and groups protested against the depiction of their prophet, which according to Islamic beliefs is 
prohibited. The satirical perspective in these drawings naturally intensified such critique. This culminated in 
a situation, where fundamental norms and values collided between the issues of religion and freedom of 
speech respectively. . This led to intense debates, demonstrations and even boycotts, bringing “innocent 
victims” such as companies into the crisis.   
 
Reactions 
 
Based on the Muhammad drawings, Danish Islamic organization “Islamiske Trossamfund” and 12 other 
Danish Islamic organizations in October 2005 in a statement demanded Jyllands-Posten to withdraw the 
drawings and further give an official apology to all Muslims. The statement contained three central 
proclamations, which “…condemned the provoking and arrogant act, which created bitterness and ethnic 
insults among Muslims in Denmark and the rest of the world” It stressed that “…the newspaper with this 
action, consciously had trampled on the ethnic and moral values of Islam, with the purpose to flatten and 
ridicule Muslims feelings, shrines and religious symbols.”, and stated that “Muslims cannot account for the 
fact that the limit of freedom of speech suddenly stops at critique of Semitism or Dannebrog [Danish flag]. 
This is perceived as hypocrisy.”  
 
However from a legal perspective, the drawings were not violating any Danish criminal law, why no official 
attempts to meet the requirements of the Danish Islamic organizations were made by Jyllands-Posten. After 
increasing debates, demonstrations and even threats to the “Muhammad drawers” life, the Danish prime 
minister in October actively chooses to enter the debate, by stressing that: “We live in a free democracy, 
where an extensive freedom of speech exists, and this freedom of speech also includes the opportunity to 
stand critically towards religion.”   
 
In a reaction to little Danish attempts to respond to the critique of the Muhammad drawing, 11 Islamic 
countries with embassies and representation in Denmark, in a protest declaration, request a meeting with 
Danish prime minister to get his response and distance taking from the Muhammad caricatures and what they 
call an “on-going smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam and Muslims.”    
As a respond to this, and with reference to the fact that “The freedom of speech is the very foundation of the 
Danish society…and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press.”, the Prime Minister 
refuses such meeting in a written statement. This decline motivates a delegation of Danish Muslims, 
primarily imams from “Islamisk Trossamfund” to travel to the Middle East in order to bring attention to the 
caricatures and discuss this matter with leading officials and religious leaders. Central for this is a 43 page 
dossier which they bring in order to influence political and religious leaders.  
The Islamic Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) which is part of “The Organization 
of The Islamic Conference” (OIC) on December 27th threaten to encourage its 51 member-countries to break 
off all economic and political relations, unless Denmark issues an official apology for “the drawings which 
has insulted the worlds Muslims.”   
In January it seemed that the crisis was flagging, when Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller and general 
secretary from The Arab League Amr Moussa agreed that the caricatures no longer should be a sticking point 
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between Denmark and the Arab countries. Nevertheless the crisis takes a critical turn when citizens in Saudi 
Arabia from 20th of January and onwards are encouraged to boycott all Danish products. These 
encouragements are spreading via emails and SMS-messages throughout the country.  The crisis at this time 
no longer exists on strictly political level, but flourishes among all spheres of society in both Middle East and 
the western world, and the consumer boycott starts to take form throughout Saudi Arabia, and soon spreads 
to Kuwait and other countries around the Middle East. Signs are placed in supermarkets encouraging 
consumers to avoid Danish products and Danish products are even removed from the shelves. At the same 
time religious and political leaders in Saudi Arabia are encouraging to boycott all Danish products. On 
January 27th the Friday prayer is used by several imams throughout the Middle East, to encourage to a 
boycott of all Danish products.    
At this time the boycott, starts to have a clear impact on Danish companies operating in the Middle East, 
especially after the largest Supermarket chain in Saudi Arabia threatens to bypass Danish products entirely 
unless an official Danish apology is given.  
Due to the increased pressure on Denmark and Danish interest, Jyllands-Posten’s editor-in-chief reacts and 
tries to explain the purpose of the drawing, stressing that no intentions to insult other people were part of 
this. He deplores unintended to have insulted Muslims. However on the grounds of freedom of speech, he 
refuses to deplore the fact of bringing the drawings. “…They were not intended to be offensive, nor were they 
at variance with Danish law, but they have indisputably offended many Muslims for which we apologize… 
That this happened was, consequently, unintentional.”  A number of Danish Islamic organizations are not 
satisfied with the apology from Jyllands-Posten. On a press conference held at Islamisk Trossamfund”, 
spokesman for the 27 organizations Ahmed Akkari states that: “We miss a clear statement, where the 
newspaper apologize the insult. That they stick to it and not subsequently give an ambiguous statement.”  
As a response to this development, the Danish Prime minister states that he personally takes distance from 
the caricatures, and stresses that the government can not, nor will apologize. “Personally I have such a 
respect for people’s religious belief, so I myself never would depict Muhammad, Jesus or other religious 
figures in a way, which can insult other people.” But emphasises that: “…freedom of speech is inviolable. It 
is meaningless, that wee give an apology.”  
Nevertheless the crisis only seems to intensify, leading to increasing boycott of Danish products and political 
attention throughout the Middle East. Syria publicly states their shock of the caricatures, which is considered 
“a great insult…which is denounced strongly.”  More critical is the governmental actions of Bahrain and 
Egypt, which both actively call for boycott of all Danish products. Early February, boycott of Danish goods 
is initiated by Omani retail chains, and Islamic retailer Ziyad Brothers suspends business with Arla. The 
president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, orders to cancel all economic contracts with countries where the 
media have published the caricatures. During February the crisis develops as several newspapers around the 
world reprints the cartoons, which led to increasing demonstrations.  
Danish Prime Minster Ander Fogh Rasmussen, appears on the Arabic TV-station Al Arabiya, where he 
explains, to the 50 million viewers, that ”the Danish government condemns every expression and action, 
which insults people religious feelings.” Despite the belief that such appearance on TV would have calmed 
the situation, the Friday prayer on February 3rd is used around the Islamic world to condemn Denmark. This 
leads to stronger demonstrations in the Middle East, where Danish flags, embassies and dummies of Danish 
politicians are set on fire.     
The crisis from Denmark’s point of view and the associated boycott is on the other hand not one sided. 
Buycott campaigns thus are initiated in especially the United States and Germany which is supporting 
Danish companies. Many western minded consumers are taking distance from the boycott and the aggressive 
reactions in the Middle East. They express this by consciously buying Danish products, and this could 
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compensate fore the economical loses Danish companies are facing, and eventually maybe even benefit the 
Danish economy. 
 
Opinions 
                                                                                                                                                                  
The debate and crisis has not only worked on an official and political level. As illustrated earlier the Middle 
East population has taken a very active position in the crisis. However, the people in western world have also 
been absorbed by the crisis. In general the population in the western world thought it was a bad idea to bring 
the drawings in the first place. They however at the same time accept and support the right to bring the 
drawings, as this is a part of the freedom of speech. (See appendix 3) 
The Danish public is divided up into equally large groups when it comes to the justification for bringing the 
drawings in the first place. However they still agree on several points. First of all a clear majority supports 
the principles of freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. Additionally a majority find that neither the 
Danish government nor Jyllands-Posten should apologise. The Danes are especially agreeing with the Danish 
government, and their unwillingness to apologies for the incidence. (See appendix 3 and 4) 
The Danish people think that leading Danish Muslims carries the main responsibility for the crisis, 
as 58 per cent pointed at the Danish Imams as them with the primary responsibility, whereas 22 
percent said that Jyllands-Posten was responsible, only 5 per cent said that the government was 
responsible and finally said 11 percent that it was the Middle Eastern governments who were 
responsible.  
 
Arla in the Muhammad crisis 
Arla was about the first Danish companies to feel the Arabic boycott, when initiated in February 2006. The 
boycott began in Saudi Arabia and soon spread to the entire Middle East. In Saudi Arabia – Arla’s main 
market in the Middle East – consumers were urged by media and religious leaders to boycott Danish 
products and as part of this, pictures of Arla’s products were shown and their name mentioned. This was 
supported by circulating emails and SMS-messages listing all Danish products sold in the Middle East.  
Distributors and specific supermarkets took a very active role in the boycott. By either completely removing 
all Arla’s products from the shelves or distinctively marking them as “Danish products” they avoided 
consumers from buying Arla products or helped them to make an active choice. Additionally many 
customers simply refused to do business with Arla and cancelled all orders, with reference to the drawings.  
The boycott led Arla to make a press release available in the local language on all it markets, where 
Executive Director Finn Hansen stated that Arla for many years “…has traded, and enjoyed good relations 
with consumers in the Middle East. In fact, we have more Muslim than Danish consumers. We respect all 
religions and wish to express our sympathy and understanding of those who feel wringed by this incident. 
Obviously, Arla Foods does not support anything that offends people’s religion or ethnic background”.  He 
further added that it was up to the parties involved to find a solution through dialogue.  
Soon after Arla decided to insert large ads in Saudi Arabia’s leading newspapers. As a press release by the 
Danish ambassador in Saudi Arabia, was not cited in local media, Arla decided to pay for its publishing. The 
ad was a straight reprint of the ambassador’s statement, without any additional comments. The ad however 
made it clear that Arla Food had paid for its insertion. Arla’s purpose was according to Finn Hansen to avoid 
further escalations of the boycott. He however added that Arla did not have particularly high expectations for 
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the ad to succeed this purpose, as he saw a dialogue between the involved parties, as the only thing which 
could bring an end to the boycott. (See appendix 5)  
As the boycott increased and spread throughout the Middle East, Arla soon faced the harsh consequences. In 
late January all customers in the region had cancelled all their orders with Arla Food, Arla products had been 
removed from many stores and sales had almost stopped completely in most of the countries.  
Arla followed the crisis intensely and via press releases commented on the situation regularly.  
After Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s statement on January 31st, Arla’s Managing 
Director, Peder Tuborgh commented that he was very satisfied with this and saw a platform for a dialogue. 
He stated that Arla were “…waiting to see how the parties involved can resolve the situation.” Arla 
recognized their role in such process and Peder Tuborgh declared they would “…make all resources 
available in order to create a dialogue which can contribute to resolving…the… destructive conflict.” He 
would however not comment on the background for the caricatures and the rightfulness in bringing them.  
"Arla is neither a newspaper nor a political party, and we don’t wish to take part in a political debate. 
Equally, we’re not responsible for solving the conflict, but we would like to contribute to a dialogue between 
the parties and urge them to find a solution.” With reference to this and the Danish freedom of speech Peder 
Tuborgh stated that: ”In Denmark we have two core values: one is that you cannot offend other people 
because of, for instance, their religion or ethnic origin. The other is free speech. I believe that both 
businesses and people have a responsibility for ensuring a balance between these two values. The one should 
not exclude the other.”  
Despite the boycott in Arabic world, Arla decided to be present on the largest food exhibition in the Middle 
East – Gulf Food - which began February 19. Regional Director Jan E. Pedersen said that this exhibition 
“…will give us the opportunity to explain the situation calmly.” Where Arla normally has used this 
exhibition to launch new products, although also doing so this time, the main motive was to work on the 
boycott. Thus during the exhibition, signs at the stand took distance from the caricatures, copies of Jyllands-
Posten’s apology was handed out and staff was present to meet with the media. Nevertheless Arla did not 
have high expectation for these initiatives to solve or have an impact on the boycott, as Jan E. Pedersen 
explained: ”We don’t expect our participation in the exhibition to have an impact on the boycott, which is 
the consumers’ choice. But we will have some valuable discussions with our business contacts.”  
The Danish population has expressed sympathy for Arla’s innocent role in the crisis, and around 50 percent 
in a poll said that they would support Arla and be conscious about buying more of Arla’s products. Arla 
could thus also report that they had received more support among its Danish stakeholders due to the crisis. In 
the middle of February 2006 Arla had thus experienced sales progress on their Danish market with more than 
15 percent. More importantly Arla could for the first time in several years note a marked improvement on its 
Danish popularity-barometer.  
Running at full scale, the boycott caused Arla a daily loss of DKK 10 million from its Middle East 
operations. Primo march Arla Food took stock on the boycott and estimated the annual cost to DKK 400 
millions. This as an estimation however assumed that products would return to Middle East stores relatively 
soon, and that Arla before the end of 2006 would have reached 50% of its pre-boycott sales in the Middle 
East. Despite this Arla looks bright on the future in this region. ”Despite the difficult situation, we believe 
that Arla has a future in the Middle East… Over 40 years, we have worked hard to build our brands in the 
Middle East in order to provide our co-operative members with a stable income. As a result, we have an 
intimate knowledge of the market and we will not give up easily.”  Peder Tuborgh 
 
"22 !""


 7 
Appendix 1. Arla Foods has distanced itself from cartoons 
 
Arla Foods has distanced itself from cartoons 
 
Statement from Arla Foods 
 
Arla Foods believes that it is our duty to convey our opinion about the unfortunate events of recent 
months. We will also set out our position for the conference for International Support for the 
Prophet in Bahrain from March 22-23, 2006, to clarify where we stand. 
Arla Foods has distanced itself from the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten’s actions in publishing 
caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed. We do not agree with the newspaper’s reasons for 
publication. 
 
On the backdrop of our 40 year history in the Middle East and as an active and integral part of 
society here, we understand why you feel insulted. Our presence in the region has given us an 
insight into your culture and values and about Islam. This understanding has, over many years, 
enabled us to supply high quality products which meet your preferences. Through your confidence 
in our products, we have succeeded in building up brands such as Lurpak, Puck, The Three Cows 
and Dano. Therefore, we understand and respect your reactions that have led to a boycott of our 
products following the Danish newspaper’s irresponsible and unfortunate action. 
 
We would also like to take this opportunity to give you some important information about our 
company. Arla is a Danish-Swedish co-operative which is owned by farmers. Our business in the 
Middle East has attracted investors and business partners from across the Arab world. Arla 
employs around 1,000 Muslims in the Arab and Islamic world as well as more than 250 Muslims in 
Europe. They have all felt insulted by these cartoons. However, Arla’s business in the Middle East 
has been affected not by its own actions, but because of the actions of others. 
 
Esteemed citizens, the years that we have spent in your world have taught us that justice and 
tolerance are fundamental values in Islam. We wish to co-operate with Islamic organisations to find 
a solution to the boycott of Arla’s products. We would simply ask you to reflect on this in the hope 
that you will reconsider your attitude to our company. 
 
Now you know more about who we are, about our attitudes and beliefs. We leave the rest to you. 
 
Arla Foods 
 
 
Source: Arla Foods. Arla Foods has distanced itself from cartoons. 
http://www.arlafoods.com/appl/HJ/HJ202COM/HJ202D01.NSF/2c8e5576cd3bf4c4c1256d030047be36/ddb7c44e9
ffbbf01c1257137004d4529/$FILE/statement%20in%20advertisement.pdf 
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Appendix 2. Distribution of markets 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETS  
 
Turnover in  
mill. DKK 
01.10.03
30.09.04
30.09.02
30.09.03
01.10.01
29.09.02
02.10.00
30.09.01
 
Denmark 9.126 9.650 9.353 9.248
 
Sweden 10.345 10.216 10.281 10.062
 
Rest of EU-countries 21.632 13.694 12.960 12.396
 
Rest of Europe 566 885 770 782
 
The Middle East 2.435 2.628 2.445 2.103
 
Northen America 1.082 1.030 1.018 928
 
Middle- and South America 
 
567 707
 
871
 
932
 
Asia 
 
1.170 1.248
 
1.264
 
1.225
 
Africa 
 
625 561
 
457
 
430
 
Rest 
 
61 28
 
22
 
27
 
Total 
 
47.608 40.647
 
39.441
 
38.133
Source: Arla Foods. Fordeling på markeder.  
http://www.arlafoods.dk/appl/HJ/HJ201AFD/HJ201D01.NSF/O/484696BA543E1196C1256D8D002CC172 
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Appendix 3. Opinion polls (Denmark and other countries)  
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Appendix 4. Opinion polls (Denmark) 
Table 1: Jylland-Posten published, in the autumn, the drawings of the prophet Muhammad in the newspaper. The drawings have 
since been criticised and discussed in several Muslim Countries. Do you think that Jyllands Posten should make an apology to the 
Muslim countries and to those living in Denmark, as a consequence of publishing the drawings?  
 Percentage 
Yes 31% 
No 62% 
Do not know 7% 
Total 100% (579 respondents) 
 
Table 2: several Muslim countries have criticised the Danish Government, by them not taking distance from the drawings published 
by Jyllands-Posten. Should the Prime Minister, according to you, make an apology on behalf of Denmark to the Muslim countries 
and those living in Denmark? 
 Percentage 
Yes 18% 
No 79% 
Do not know 3% 
Total 100% (579 respondents) 
 
Table 3: Why should the Prime Minister apology? 
 Percentage 
Because Danish industry is suffering 21% 
Because many Muslims feel degraded 32% 
Because it damages the perception of Denmark in the Muslim countries 26% 
Because of increased terror threat 19% 
Other reasons 2% 
Total 100% (132 respondents) 
 
Table 4: Which of the following statements do you primarily agree with? 
 Percentage 
It is acceptable for Jyllands-Posten to publish the drawings of Muhammad, 
and I do not understand the critique of the Muslims 
 
20% 
Jyllands-Posten has the right to publish the drawings of Muhammad, 
however, I understand the critique of the Muslims 
 
58% 
Jyllands-Posten should not have published the drawings in the newspaper 22% 
Total 100 (577 respondents) 
 
Table 6: As a result of the drawings of Muhammad, Danish goods have been listed on the boycott list of Saudi Arabia. How should 
the prime minister act in respect to this? 
 Percentage 
The Prime Minister should, due to export interest apologies to the Muslim 
world  
8% 
The Prime Minister should try to explain the Danish interest, by example 
having a meeting with the ambassadors of the Muslim countries  
 
44% 
The Prime Minister should not apologies to the Muslim countries, as this 
would be a wrongful political intervention of the principle of freedom of 
speech. 
 
48% 
Total 100% (577 respondents) 
Source: DR. Epinion: Ingen skal undskylde Muhammed tegninger 
http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2006/01/28/062331.htm 
 
 
 
 
"22 !""


 13 
Appendix 5. Statement of the Danish embassy, which Arla Foods publishes in the Middle East   
THE DANISH GOVERNMENT 
RESPECTS ISLAM 
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1 Introduction 
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its 
success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.  
-Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince  
 
 
 	

Companies have realized that their intangible assets increasingly are becoming a central part of survival on a 
competitive environment. As differentiation on the product it self has given little value to companies, a shift 
towards branding of products and even the corporation itself, has occurred. In this way corporations has 
found branding, and hereby the association to meanings and values, to be one of the few remaining 
differentiators in order to obtain long lasting competitive advantage. Branding has become a strategic issue 
in all sectors and branches, where the use of branding is seen as an important and often necessary 
competitive tool. (Kapferer 2004)    
 
Corporations have recognized that the brand can be expanded, and is more than a mere catchphrase, or a logo 
etc. which is backed up by advertising. Rather the entire corporation is found to have a brand identity and 
hence is suitable for branding in order to create a corporate consciousness. (Klein 2005) This has led to vast 
amount of corporate branding initiatives. They seek to transfer and project the corporate identity in the 
products in order to give basis for differentiation, which is assumed to be based on real rather than fabricated 
meanings and values. These initiatives are not only aimed at customers, but increasingly also at other 
stakeholders. This is so because companies not only need the support from customers, but also various other 
stakeholders in order to stay competitive. (Balmer and Greyser 2003)  
 
With these changes also came a new imperative towards branding. Where branding originally was a part of 
advertising and more represented as a distinctive trademark, branding has increasingly become a strategic 
and proactive task for corporations. This implies a strategic control over the corporate brand, and setting 
forth what it stands for in the eyes of both customers and other stakeholders, and communicating such 
identity effectively and efficiently (Aaker 2002a). In this way the branding strategy is linked to the business 
strategy, which both should reflect the same strategic vision and corporate culture. Such strategic and 
visionary approach to branding has broadened the scope, so multiple products and markets increasingly are 
included under a corporate brand. (Aaker 2002a) This offers the companies several advantages. First of all it 
is possible to draw on the corporate values, which is able to offer authentic and deeper meanings for the 
stakeholders. Secondly such values can be projected in several products in various markets, and thereby 
bring a highly coherent identity, which at the same time is differentiated. Finally this is done from a 
economic rationale offering companies not only a competitive advantage based on such differentiation but 
this also at a lower cost due to the  reflection of identity across products and markets. This among others 
means, that the brand architecture has become much more complex. (Aaker 2002a) 
 
With increasingly popularized terms such as “the globalized world” and the “global village”, the world might 
on the surface seem very uniform and integrated. Nevertheless fundamental differences still exists, with 
respect to elements such as cultures, values, economical status. This influences the corporations in their 
attempt to take on a truly global branding strategy.  
Furthermore, brands are increasingly being influenced or even, as Lindstrom (2005) argues, owned by the 
consumers. This is so, due to increasingly critical, demanding and resistant customers and stakeholders, as 
well as more developed interactive communications forms.  
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This does not only relate to the products in narrow terms, but increasingly also the value of the corporations. 
This has put attention to elements such as social responsibility and ethics of corporations. The argument for 
this, among others, rests upon increased interest from non governmental organisations with respect to global 
corporations and their social responsibility (Deri 2003). Thus, in order to infuse meaning to the brand, 
corporations seek out authentic scenes, important causes and cherished public events. This is however not 
without problems. Klein (2005) argues that this often causes the expansive branding process to be usurped, 
creating a quintessential lose-lose situation. 
 
From this it is clear, that not only do important differences exist between cultures and countries, but the 
brands surroundings are also becoming critical, influential and integral parts of today’s branding scene. This 
results in various uncontrollable factors which infringes on the corporate brand image. This puts pressure on 
corporations in order to work in such complex environment. Where branding theory traditionally has 
assumed a more controllable and influential approach to the surroundings, such recent developments calls for 
further understanding on external parties influence on the brand. 
 
 	

Corporate brands are increasingly found to be a feasible way to infuse meaning and identity to the products. 
Such practise has however become increasingly complex for corporations as they are facing new stakeholder 
demands and cultural diversity in the globalized environment. Likewise it has been noticed that such 
practise, which increasingly is done on a global scale, can infringe on the brand. Adding to this, is the raging 
competition, where companies differentiate themselves increasingly to stand out, but at the same time tries to 
approach several different stakeholders with standardised values and norms. However as the brand scope 
increases, and tries to address several products and markets, the corporate brand is being stretched to its 
limits. Addressing different customers and other stakeholders, with several products under one corporate 
brand on a global level, challenges brand managers with respect to the need for brand consistency and 
authenticity. Moreover stakeholders put pressure on corporate policies and thereby the corporate brand, in 
order to live up to certain expectations, values and needs.  
 
Examples such as Nike with its Asian sweetshops and Nestlé and their infant formula, are all examples of 
corporate brands which have been under attack from stakeholders and ultimately boycotted because of 
certain corporate actions. This stresses traditional boycott situations, where companies are being boycotted 
due to their own actions and values – and therefore are lacking stakeholder integration.  
 
However, a different kind of boycotts has started to emerge. As brands has become more global combined 
with a globalizing world, with increasingly global consciousness among people, diverse values and cultures 
meets. This puts the global brands in a more complex situation. Hereby companies no longer seem to be 
judged on their own actions and behaviours alone, but also their apparent relation to actions and behaviours 
of others. The examples of French companies being boycotted after the French nuclear testing in the Pacific, 
and more recently the boycott of Arla in the Middle East due to the Muhammad crisis, stresses a new threat 
for global brands. These companies has opposed to Nike and Nestlé not been boycotted and become under 
attack because of corporate actions or values. Rather due to their origin these companies has been drawn into 
a fierce conflict. This is a problem which increasingly can be expected to occur in the future, due to the 
increasing globalization of brands and diversity of markets. This however is an area, which so far has 
remained untreated in branding literature. It points to the fact, that corporate brands increasingly are facing 
uncontrollable factors which influence their perceived brand image. Especially on a global scene, differences 
exist between the corporate projected identity and the perceived image. Central for this is how such 
uncontrollable factors influence the corporate brand global image, and how image is created differently 
across various stakeholders on a global scale.   
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The dilemma for the corporate brand is how to meet and satisfy various stakeholders with individual needs 
and expectations of what they treasure and find to be correct according to their believes. This dilemma has 
shown to be even harder to address in a business environment where brands increasingly are becoming 
global and being perceived according to their apparent connection with external actions and policies from 
e.g. governments or states. So far, literature has addressed these issues with respect to the concepts of brand 
identity and brand diversity, and stressed the need for balance between these. Nonetheless, as companies has 
gone global, it challenges brands and their inherent identity in respect to the degree of which it can be 
diversified and adapted to various markets which contains fundamental value and cultural differences. This 
raises critical questions of how a global corporate brand can address different stakeholders and at the same 
time reflect a coherent identity.    
 
At the very fundamental level, certain values and meanings of brands and its identity are so deeply routed, 
that they are extremely hard or even impossible to change. This, as the examples has illustrated, also relates 
to the values of other parties to which the corporation only has an indirect or perceived relation to. This can 
be regarded as a strong barrier for corporate brands in their strive for global presence. 
 
The recent crisis of Arla Foods (Arla) in the Middle East is an example of the discussed issues, which calls 
for a deeper understanding of corporate brands and how image is created individually among different 
stakeholders in a global business environment. 
 
 	
The boycott of Arla in the Middle East, stresses a new issue of global corporate brand management. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is motivated by the case of Arla and the lack of branding theories which 
can explain this recent phenomenon.   
 
Due to the lack of brand literature regarding this specific case, we seek to develop an understanding of this 
very specific issue. By addressing central elements and developments of the crisis, we want to engage in a 
creative learning experience, which aims to apply, adapt and evaluate known theories related to such crisis. 
This is done from a corporate branding perspective in order to illustrate the complexities which global brands 
are facing. The study does not seek to give any definitive or unambiguous answers regarding such specific 
crisis situation, but rather develop an understanding for how such crisis can come about and stress a 
conscious approach for addressing and acting under such corporate brand threat. It is the purpose that this 
should give an insight to the complexity of such abnormal brand situation. Further, it is essential, in the case 
of Arla, to address the issue of how corporations can or should act in a situation where their perceived image, 
to a larger extent is evaluated and given meaning to by infighting external stakeholders.  
More specifically we intend to develop and understanding of how corporations can act before, up to and 
under a surrogate boycott and finally how the corporate brand is influenced under such circumstances. Based 
on four questions, we seek to develop an understanding of this crisis and engage in a learning experience.  
 
How has Arla’s corporate brand been influenced under the Muhammad crisis? 
This question seeks to understand how externally perceived brand elements such as image and reputation is 
constructed outside the corporation. Especially in such a situation this should shed light to the complexity of 
creating a link between the intended and perceived brand.    
 
How should Arla, from the initiation of this conflict, as a global brand had acted up to the boycott in 
February 2006? 
Here we intend, with basis in the influence described and analyzed above, to give recommendations based 
upon Arla’s actions up to the boycott. This should give an understanding for what could and should have 
been done as a brand in such a situation.  
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Evaluate Arla’s proposed advertising campaign in the Middle East, and argue whether or not it should be 
conducted? 
The 19th of March 2006 Arla decided to initiate a larger advertising campaign in the Middle East. Here 
sympathy for Islam, together with a presentation of Arla as an “innocent corporation” in this crisis was 
stated. This campaign led to strong debates primarily in the Danish community. Arguments such as “Arla not 
staying true to Danish fundamental values” were given. This is central for such a complex situation, and 
clearly stresses the diverse expectations of various stakeholders. 
    
With respect to the corporate brand, discuss how Arla should act internationally in order to avoid future 
similar situations? 
This can be seen as a conclusion of such a complex brand situation and the earlier answered questions, by 
developing a strategy for Arla’s future global brand strategy. This naturally seeks to reflect on such case, and 
develop a strategy which potentially can place Arla in a better position to handle or even avoid future similar 
incidents.  
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2 Methodology 
I see and I forget. I hear and I remember. I do and I understand. 
-Chinese proverb 

 
 
This study is not about to bring definitive and strict theoretical developments and is not to be viewed as 
research in its traditional form. We are very clear and conscious about this matter, but do however not see 
this as a limitation in the usefulness or value of this study. Rather we see this study as an essential part of 
real-life management, which essentially is about determining actions under uncertain circumstances 
	
 This study is in other words balancing between research and practice, which is 
something we find neglected in much management research. By providing very narrowly defined or abstract 
research building upon previous research in a linear fashion, we unfortunately many times find management 
researches out of tune with the interests of practitioners. Therefore this study sets about to provide not only 
us as researchers, but also the readers with a learning experience. As we have become acquainted with much 
academic literature during our studies, we often have difficulties in attaching these smaller parts to the 
bigger picture of real life situations and thereby develop our practical skills. Moreover much research, how 
good and convincing it might be, after some time often leaves the reader with little memory traces. This is 
unfortunate for us as future managers, which cannot assume a partial approach to broad problems. We 
don’t want this study to become just another part of the big “academic cobweb”. Rather this seeks to 
develop the practical skills for both us as researchers and for the reader. We believe that an interactive 
problem solving role to broad and complex real life situations gives both us as researchers and readers the 
best output, with respect to practical skills.    
    
 	
We see reality as a product which is not independent of us, but consists as an interaction between our own 
experiences. We think that reality can be described from the individual’s subjective understanding of reality. 
This means that we believe reality only can be described through the individual’s opinions, attitudes and 
values. In this way the individual is seen as the creator of reality, which therefore is seen as socially and 
experientially based (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). This implies an ontological position, from where we 
approach reality as relativists.  
Therefore we find ourselves best in line with the social constructionist approach which implies that reality in 
objective terms doesn’t exist (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). This relates to the subject of study, which deals 
with various stakeholders influence and attitudes in what can be regarded a “high contextual” setting, where 
attitudes and opinions have shown to be of critical importance. A social constructionist approach is more 
likely to illustrate complexity, richness and diversity among such behaviour and thereby increase the general 
understanding of the situation (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). This gives the opportunity to work independently 
from existing theories and instead develop theories and solutions specifically aimed at this very specific case, 
thereby working interpretive (Bryman and Bell 2003).  
 
Thus we find this approach best suited for illustrating the diversity and richness of attitudes. At the same 
time this approach allows us to make use of existing theories - but in a flexible and creative way (Bryman 
and Bell 2003). With the status of surrogate boycotts and this case specifically as relative unexplored and 
new areas we find this essential. With such approach we are able to work in a way, still based on theories, 
which makes the process more structured and the results more generally acceptable and relatable by both 
practitioners and researchers (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). 
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This suits the aim of this study, which is to increase and create an understanding and generalizability through 
theoretical abstraction, which incorporate the complexity of this setting. This is in line with the social 
constructionist’s subjective epistemological approach, with the inquirer and the inquirered being fused into a 
single unity, where findings are based on their interaction (Guba 1990). This can only be done on the basis of 
rich data, from which ideas and understanding ultimately can be induced. This is among the strengths of 
social constructionism, which gives the opportunity to understand people’s meanings and add to the 
development of new theories – which exactly is the two main aims of this research (Easterby-Smith et al 
2002). 
       
We can thus be considered to take on, what is termed a critical view of management. We thus see the most 
important part of management to be the sense making of ambiguous and complex situations through dialogue 
and conversations (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). We find this very central with respect to management 
research in general and specifically for this case. This is so because management as a discipline contains 
some distinctive problems which in general are not to be found within traditional social sciences from where 
most research methodology originates. First of all we see the management as an eclectic practice, as mangers 
are working across technical, cultural and functional boundaries. Secondly and perhaps most important in 
this connection, is that management requires both thought and action. This implies a need for incorporating 
potential actions in the methodology used. Thus in line with the social constructionist approach, we do not 
believe, that one definitive truth exists, and consequently the aim of this study is to gain a larger 
understanding in this very specific case (Freytag 2002).This study can therefore primarily be termed an 
understanding-analysis, which aims to create a larger understanding. However on the other hand it has a 
clear motive for action-learning – which implies a change-analysis approach (Freytag 2002). Therefore we 
seek to imply the change elements in our understanding approach to this study with the purpose to actively 
familiarize oneself with, and gain an understanding of the studied.     
 
 			
In order for management research to become valuable, outside academic circles, it is essential that it stays in 
touch with concerns and interest of practitioners. By retaining a purpose and value for the outside world in a 
responsive way, is the only approach to contributing directly to dissemination of knowledge (Tranfield and 
Starkey 1998). However, there naturally do exist differences between research and practice. Gummesson 
(2000) thus sees academic researchers and management consultants as two different groups of knowledge 
workers, who each place different emphasis on theory and practice. This difference is captured by the 
following: “Backed by bits and pieces of theory, the consultant contributes to practice, whereas the scholar 
contributes to theory supported by fragments of practice.” (Gummesson 2000). In other words each persona 
draws on the others work. This is essential for the understanding of how to contribute to knowledge 
production with relevant research, and hence their internal relations should not be neglected. It is essentially 
this connection which makes both types of knowledge production valuable. It is rather the proportions of 
these two dimensions which are up for the individual researcher to determine upon.  
 
We seek to take a pragmatic approach to this, stressing the importance of practice, while not neglecting the 
importance of theories. From a methodological perspective we therefore seek to work interpretive, through 
hermeneutic processes. This is so because we see a clear difference between explaining and understanding. 
As this research sets out to understand a very specific and complex case, which cannot be subordinated to an 
objective or quantitative rule, we find this essential.  
Hence the research process can primarily be regarded as inductive in its relation to theories. Theories or an 
understanding is thus the outcome of the research rather than the starting point. This implies drawing 
generalizable inferences out of the observations made (Bryman and Bell 2003). This is strongly related to the 
specific case under investigation, which little theories seems to apply directly to. But when this is said, the 
research does contain elements of deduction. Thus the process of reaching an understanding of this specific 
issue, involves an iterative approach weaving back and forth between data and theory. This is seen as part of 
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the hermeneutic circle, where we strive to avoid homespun philosophy, by applying a critical interpretation 
of data. Such interpretation is sought on the basis of connections and contrasts, which is identified on the 
basis of theoretical knowledge as perspectives to maintain our critical thought (Heldbjerg 2001). Every 
finding is thus compared to existing knowledge and theories in order to create a new understanding on a 
continual and ongoing basis. The way this is done in practise, will be outlined in the following. 
         
 			
The research design followed in this research is not one of a clear-cut distinctive format. Rather the research, 
based on the purpose, tries to combine a traditional distinctive research design with a unique learning 
method. Based on the case method (Hammond 2002), this research tries to create an understanding through 
an active learning experience. This is done by creating and solving a case from the case method perspective.  
 
The case method is essentially an exercise which “calls for discussion of real-life situations that business 
executives have faced.” (Hammond 2002). This method is arguable the most relevant and practical way to 
learn managerial skills, as it puts the reader in the managers place in order to analyze the situation and decide 
viable actions (Hammond 2002). It is this exercise which creates an understanding and a learning experience, 
which helps to develop concrete managerial skills. Inline with this we develop a case from the case method 
perspective, which subsequently is solved by us as researchers, from which we derive our own understanding 
and learning experience. This solution is also part of the research, which can be regarded as both a 
supplement to the case developed, and as a stand-alone research in its own right. In order for research to 
serve such dual purpose, the research design has been constructed accordingly. 
 
As explained earlier, this learning and understanding is not only intended us as researchers, and then 
disseminated to readers in a traditional passive sense. Rather the purpose also is, to create, a case from which 
readers can develop an understanding and learning experience on their own. This challenges the research 
design, as no methodological theory so far has taken such perspective. This is unfortunate, as we see a strong 
relevance in such concept. Not only does it provide valuable research in it self and challenges us a 
researchers, it also disseminates this research in probably the most effective and active way. In other words, 
such type of research is highly relevant and is able to contribute with not only new but also useful 
knowledge. Moreover, this is able to be done convincingly contributing both to theoretical and practical, 
which characterises strong and relevant research. (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). Adding to this is that such 
research approach will be able to do so by offering both researchers and readers an understanding. This is 
something not to be neglected. While much research, especially within the social constructionist thought, 
with good intentions, claim to do so, this is not always the case when it comes to practise. While specific 
complex situations, can be illustrated rigorously through deep insights, sense-making and theoretical 
abstractions, this simply might be to overwhelming for not only readers but also the researchers themselves. 
While this truly offers new knowledge, the concrete understanding might be lacking, why such knowledge 
might be reduced little more than information. In a society where information is anything but lacking, such 
research will do no more than add to the already existing information overload. This is something which 
challenges the true dissemination of research in order to obtain practical usage. Only by entering the mind 
consciously as useful knowledge and developing an understanding for the specific context, can research 
obtain practical value.   
We believe there is a better way to develop and disseminate research. This goes through an active 
involvement of both researchers and readers in the research in order to develop knowledge which is 
understood of both.    
 
The developed case has therefore been developed on the premises of the case method, while the research 
itself is founded in a case study design with strong references to the case method of how to learn from such 
exercise. This also means that this entire research projects consists of two separate, but related parts. Part one 
contains a case written from a Harvard Business School case method perspective. Part two, and thereby the 
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following, consists of a case method, which builds on the case method perspective. The second part thus 
serves as our direct contribution to knowledge and understanding development, by solving the case and 
thereby disseminating the results whereas part one does this on an indirect basis. Here it is up to the reader to 
actively develop his own knowledge and understanding. Part two can however be regarded as a supplement 
for the reader in such process.  
 
Although carrying the basis for quantitative research, both the case method and a case study design have in 
general a tendency, to be associated with qualitative research (Hammond 2002, Bryman and Bell 2003). This 
study will also, not based on this tendency, but rather because of the relevance, build upon qualitative 
research. This is so because qualitative research emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection 
and analysis of data. This relates to the desired inductive orientation of this study. Furthermore as the study 
works within the theoretical frames of branding, which per definition relates to emotions, attitudes and other 
intangible factors, qualitative research is better to capture and illustrate such, and ultimately give the basis 
for an analysis which can lead to the creation of knowledge and understanding. Finally, as the basis for this 
study has shown, we are living in a constantly changing social reality, based on individuals’ creation. Once 
again such qualitative research offers better opportunities to give meaning to complex issues as compared to 
quantitative research which usually is related to issues where measuring is of interest. Furthermore, 
qualitative research also opens for a deeper understanding of this particular phenomenon. Keeping the 
purpose and the characteristic of the specific case in mind we there find that qualitative research gives the 
best basis interpretation. We will however to less extent make use of quantitative data, but this is more to 
illustrate certain points in the case method more detailed. They will not serve any isolated purpose, but only 
as backup for the collected qualitative research. Therefore, this aspect will not be treated any further.   
 
In our research process the case method can be regarded as the foundation for the case study. It hence can be 
seen as part of the methods of data collection to establish the foundation for the case study design. Therefore, 
the case method together with the other used methods will be describe in the following section, whereas we 
first will describe the case study design in further details.    
  
 		
The case study design is essentially a detailed and intensive analysis of a single case and is concerned with 
the complexity and specific nature of this (Bryman and Bell 2003). This case study will concern the single 
event of Arla in the Muhammad crisis, and use this as the basis for research in order to develop knowledge 
and understanding. This is important to point out, as the case itself becomes an object of interest which we 
aim to provide and in-depth elucidation of. Without such distinction, it is difficult to distinguish the case 
study as a special research design. (Bryman and Bell 2003) 
What make this case study interesting are the unique features in the surroundings, which Arla have faced 
under the Muhammad crisis. Hereby can the event studied be characterized as a revelatory case study 
(Bryman and Bell 2003). This implies that we, as investigators, for the first time have an opportunity to 
observe and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible. This case study will take a longitudinal 
perspective, in order to capture the development of the revelatory aspects of the case study. This is in order 
to elucidate the very unique aspects of this case in point, which has developed over a longer period of time. 
Little understanding will be obtained by only treating an isolated part of such complex situation.  
 
The case study happens on the background of a case, developed after the case method. This means that the 
case study will contain some standardized design features in order to be able to deliver the proposed benefits 
of learning under the case method. Therefore, the research will happen on the basis of the created case 
method with a strong reference to various existing theories. The case study has been designed to focus on 
four central issues, which the managers of Arla have faced under this crisis. We have done this in order to 
structure our own research and thereby be able to work with a strong focus. This also lets us work with 
certain critical, and as the case has shown, new elements within branding whereby we can expect to develop 
new knowledge and understanding. Finally it is also seen as part of the external aim, why it for the reader of 
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the case, is essential that they also can work with the case in a way giving basis for argumentation and 
analysis, which still is structured within the frame of branding. This is also the reason why we have decided 
only to treat the case up to Arla advertising campaign March 19th 2006. We see as a major development and 
very active involvement from Arla’s in the crisis. Consequently we find this a central point for both us and 
the reader to understand the consequences of and take a decision to. 
Although we acknowledge the problems concerning the inherent subjectiveness of such research, we still 
find that this method is the most appropriate. This is due to our view of reality combined with the 
phenomenon of interest which stresses a rather complex and unique features.   
 
 	
In order for our research to live up to the purpose, the case method is of critical importance. Not only is it the 
foundation of our case study design, it is also part of the purpose to create a case with external relevance. In 
both instances it is central that the case method can help sharpen analytical skills in order to produce 
evidence to support recommendations (Hammond 2002). Without a strong elucidating background neither 
we as researcher nor external readers will be able to defend arguments and analyses. It is therefore central, 
that the case method brings the basis for recognition of certain managerial problems. Learning after the case 
method only occurs when the reader is presented to real problems which are solved through active learning 
by doing. While specific questions are given, the case reader must still ask himself what the real problem is 
in order to solve such question. Such answering does not provide the answer, but rather one viable to it. This 
also relates to our conception of reality and management, which we do not consider an exact science. 
Therefore, although many academics and consultant claim so, in realty there is no single, demonstrable right 
answer to business problems. The important thing is therefore not the answer as such, as there always exists 
the opportunity that an even better answer exists. Rather it is important that the individual know what to do 
in a situation and most importantly why! Such skills can not be acquired through books or lectures, but only 
through the practice of analyzing real business situations. The approach to learning by the case method is 
illustrated in the following model.      
 
Figure  1 Learning by the case method (own construction) 
This gives certain implications for the development of a case. While the case itself must be clear-cut and 
precise, it should also stress the complexity of the specific case. In order to gather such data for the 
development of this specific case, we have used several sources. Besides the relevant theoretical literature, 
which will give us the basis for analyzing the case, these all relates to document sources. These have been 
selected in order to stress the multiple actors and the complexity of this specific case. These are all 
documents, which has not been produced at the request of a business researcher, why they must be 
assembled and ultimately analysed of us (and readers) as researchers. This is not a straight forward task as it 
might seem. Rather the search for documents is a highly complex and protracted process, as it must be able 
to live up to the purpose and be able to stress the multiple actors. Finally, and perhaps most importantly 
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when collected, the data must be structured, its meaning ascertain and analyzed. This can be more complex 
than with data which does not exist and therefore is collected for a specific purpose, which inflict on the 
complexity of the hermeneutical process, which will be discussed later on.  
 
  	
Central for documents as sources for research, is their quality. This is a highly debated subject, which 
implies a conscious approach to documents. Scott (1990) distinguishes four different criteria’s for evaluating 
the quality of documents. Authencity refers to the origin of the documents, meaning whether this is genuine 
and unquestionable. Credibility refers to the evidence of error and distortion free sources. Representativeness 
relates to the evidence for typicality. Finally meaning, concerns whether the evidence is clear and 
comprehensible.   
From Scott’s (1990) criteria’s for evaluating the quality of documents, we have used three types of 
documents, namely public documents, organisational documents and mass media outputs (Bryman and Bell 
2003).    
 
First of all, we have used mass media outputs, in specific several international newspapers, one Danish 
business magazine (www.borsen.dk) and the internet site of the largest Danish TV station (www.dr.dk). As 
all these sources represent larger news agencies, we have little reason to believe that data from these is 
questionable in terms of quality. The mass media output has primarily been used to collect data with respect 
to the overall development of the crisis and the different events.  
 
To go deeper into the crisis, we have used organisational and public documents. This is in order to get a 
better grasp of certain events and better illustrate the complexity, and thereby ultimately create the basis for 
the development of a deep understanding.  
 
Organisational documents have primarily been related to Arla and their reactions to the crisis. These are 
direct statements posted on their corporate homepage (www.arlafoods.com) as information and press 
releases. Additionally we have found data concerning their strategy and markets here as well. We do not find 
any reason to question such information. Organisational documents have also been used to capture some 
other important actors in the crisis besides Arla. Such data has been found on the respective organisations 
homepage. This has added to the data which has been presented in the mass media, as this often is an 
interpretation or reference to such organisations. From a quality perspective we find it better to seek out 
these original sources whenever possible.  
 
Finally, public documents from the Danish government and other official sources have been used in order to 
concretize the high level this crisis has worked on. These official sources of governmental or semi-
governmental organs are in essence to be regarded of high quality, and as they primarily relates to certain 
opinions which the organ represents, we find no reason to question these.        
Generally for the data collection we have therefore also, when possible, always sought the original source. 
This is likely to bring more quality in data, as distortion, misinterpretations will not be passed on to third-
parties. 
     
With this data collected, we have written the case from which the later analysis is based upon. We have 
placed much focus upon selecting the most important events. Naturally this is done from a subjective 
perspective, and whether we have selected the right data to bring in the case, can always be debated. In order 
to create a thorough and deep, yet concrete and straight forward case, we have made extensive use of 
quotations and appendices in the case. We find this essential for the case reader, and thereby also us as 
researchers in order to get a good grasp of the complex situation in a condensed matter – which the case 
method essentially is about.  
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It was previously discussed that a broad theoretical scope is an appropriate approach to secure a good and 
comprehensive understanding of Arla’s position in the Muhammad crisis. The literature selected ranges from 
basic brand literature to crisis management. We believe that such approach is needed to fulfil the purpose. 
Brand literature is essential due to the studies nature and its purpose, since branding is the central focus 
point. Especially, resources have been put into the concepts of brand identity and image. Further central 
literature which has been included and discussed is concepts of corporate branding, corporate social 
responsibility, brands in a global environment, stakeholder perspectives, crisis management and finally 
boycott theory. All included literature has carefully been chosen and evaluated to be essential for the desired 
outcomes of this study. The literature presented in the literature review will extensively be included in the 
analysis, together with the facts and events from the Muhammad crisis, to come up with our evaluations and 
conclusion. 
 
From the developed case, an discussion and analysis follows. The analysis build upon a general 
understanding of surrogate boycotts which we have developed in the discussion section. This has been part 
of our hermeneutical process, where we have went from a general understanding, to a more specific 
understand, and finally ending up in applying this understanding on the specific case of Arla. In the 
discussion three central areas are identified and discussed, these act as the foundation for the later analysis. 
This analysis is as earlier explained, centering around four central issues of the crisis. These four issues have 
been constructed after our construction of the case. Through hermeneutically processes, waving back 
between the case, existing theories and the discussion, we find these questions essential for the understanding 
of this case in a corporate branding context. The argument for these questions has earlier been given. This 
naturally has certain implications for the reader of the case, but both for us as researchers and creators this is 
essential to keep a focus of the study. It is therefore our interpretation of the essential aspects of the crisis 
which these questions reflect. On the other hand it also brings a focus to the reader of the case, which is a 
normal practise within case methods.  
 
The final analysis has likewise been based on a hermeneutical process, where we with basis in existing 
knowledge and related theories to the questions have tried to solve the respective questions and thereby bring 
out meaning of the case. This process has included a continual search for new knowledge through literature 
and theories, which we have found applicable. From such ongoing search, we have constructed our own 
understanding of the crisis and the essence to solve the questions, and this has led application, revision and 
development of theories.   
 
! 		"
To evaluate the quality in a certain study different approaches can be used. Three commonly used concepts 
are reliability, validity and generalizability. These serve to determine whether the study is trustworthy or not. 
Still, the appropriateness of these depends on the actual research approach. (Easterby-Smith et al 2002)  
 
The context to which degree such concepts can be used with respect to a case study depends on the 
researchers felt appropriateness, and much discussion has centred on their relevance in such context (Bryman 
and Bell 2003). We believe that case studies to some degree, can and should, be evaluated according to these 
concepts.  
As this case treats several actors over a period of more than seven months with clear references to the data 
sources, the study gains access to experiences in the setting. This implies validity from a social 
constructionist perspective (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). As these sources have been directly quoted and 
referenced, and as the process of making sense of the raw data has been thoroughly examined, we also see 
this study as reliable from a social constructionist point of view (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). With the 
purpose to create a deep understanding of this specific and unique case, we however do not find any 
justifiable basis for claiming a strong generalizability of the findings. We do not delude ourselves into 
believing, that the finding from the case represents a sample of one. However, with the basis of such case 
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study as an intensive analysis, we believe we can generate theories out of it from our developed 
understanding. This relates back to our inductive approach and the characteristics of case studies. Thus, as 
argued by both Mitchell (1983) and Yin (1984) the essential thing is not whether case studies can generate 
findings to a wider extent, but rather to which degree researchers can generate theories from the findings. 
Thus, with the aim to examine this new and complex issue, we will argue that we based on a intensive 
examination of this single case from where we derive an understanding which can engage us in a theoretical 
analysis. Moreover it will give us practical skills in approaching, analyzing and solving complex managerial 
issues, which in any case can be generalized and used later on. As earlier explained, such skills are not to 
neglect for us as future managers and for the readers of the case method.         
 
# $

This study covers the Arla’s role in the Muhammad crisis from a branding perspective. Due to this specific 
focus certain limitations will have to be stressed.  
As the case of Arla is very comprehensive and complex, various elements such as Arla’s internal strategic 
vision and economical factors have been left out. We are not neglecting that these variables are highly 
important for Arla’s motivated strategic actions during the crisis, but due to limited resources, data 
accessibility and our interest of solely evaluating the situation from a branding perspective we believe that 
such limitations are appropriate. Future research, investigating and implementing our mentioned limitations, 
would be of interest for a more in-depth understanding in respect to how Arla has decided to address the 
crisis, and might contribute to a more developed understanding for corporate decision making in such 
situation, where strategic goals are balanced with the element of branding. Such information about Arla’s 
internal strategic perspectives and the economical variables could be collected and added to this study, by 
conducting personal interviews. 
 
A further limitation is our approach to data collection. We have exclusively collected secondary data, 
nevertheless, primary research could be suitable to collect more specific data regarding central elements in 
the case. An interesting study would for instance be to examine the impact of the crisis in respect to Arla 
image. This study merely uses known literature and published resources to predict stakeholder reactions. A 
different perspective could have been taken by conducting interviews and surveys to create a more specific 
understanding of the various stakeholder opinions. Such data is of great interest and importance in a 
managerial decision situation, and such research is recommended to get an even better understanding and in-
sight of how to respond in this specific crisis.  
 
We primarily been focusing on the Danish and Middle Eastern markets, nevertheless, a wider perspective 
would be of interest as well. By taking a wider perspective and include other countries perceptions of the 
crisis and upon Arla’s image, would all ad to the overall picture of the crisis.  
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3 Literature review 
Literature is news that stays news. 
-Ezra Pound, ABC of Reading 
 
 
 %
In today’s society, brands are increasingly being recognized as a tool for companies to create sustainable 
competitive advantage (Urde 1994). Brands are a name, which is capable of influencing customers in their 
purchase decision. Saliency, differentiation, intensity and trust are in this connection, prominent 
characteristics, which makes a brand powerful.    
Brands are no longer just a symbol on a product, but they have become valuable assets for the corporation. 
The brand evokes certain associations and emotions in the consumer’s mind which increases the value of the 
actual product, and reduces time and perceived risk of purchasing the product. (Kapferer 2004)  
 
Brands are in this way able to create value for both companies and customers. This happens on the basis of 
differentiation on both tangible and intangible dimensions. Here the brand reputation is a central element. A 
brand is built up over time by promoting a product innovation. In time as the market grows and competitors 
enters the market, the brand may be preferred over similar products because of habit, proximity, leadership, 
pioneering aura and most of all assurance. Hereby a brand name is able to protect companies from growing 
competition. Such protection does not last however. This necessitates an ongoing differentiation and 
development of the brand and its both tangible and intangible elements. (Kapferer 2004) 
 
 %	&
	
As a consequence of growing competition, brands are increasingly found to be based on desires and 
emotional aspirations rather than needs. Facets such as ethic, sustainable growth and equitable commerce are 
gradually brought forward as brand strengths bringing added value, promoting the brand as not a pure 
business construct with a responsible attitude. Such developments involve the entire organisation, so 
branding no longer just can be entrusted to the marketing department. The intangible elements of a brand are 
rather the responsibility of the entire organisation. (Kapferer 2004) 
Brand identity is looking at the brand from a corporate perspective, with the purpose to create a 
differentiated product with unique features. It is through the identity the corporation tries to express its 
individuality and distinctiveness to certain publics (Nandan 2005). It is only through the identity the 
corporation can develop a unique brand.  
In this way the identity defines what can change and what can not. Brands should be regarded as living 
organisms making the necessary adaptations to the environment, nevertheless it is important they stay true to 
them self which is the only way they can develop in a coherent, durable and realistic way – which is the 
essence of dealing with the concept of brand identity. In order to be durable, the identity should be based on 
a personal goal which should be both different to others’ and resistant to change. (Kapferer 2004).     
 
In this way companies should create brands containing a core-identity which has a position which will not 
get out of date (Aaker 2002b). The reason to speak of brand identity first of all, is the realization of acting 
consciously in the management of brands. Previous brand attention has centred on brand image, however this 
is a rather reactive approach. Thus image is the brand as perceived by the customer, but only by knowing 
what to send and how to send it, can a brand actively develop effectively and thereby create a desired image. 
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This calls for a stronger commitment of the sending side of brand management than rather just image on the 
receiving side.  
 
A strong identity is essentially to be true to oneself, and be driven by a personal goal that is both different to 
others and resistant to change. In this way it is essential for the brand to form a solid and coherent entity, 
with deep values, which can be portrayed in external signs. In other words, the identity defines the degree of 
freedom for the brand to change. Identity is to be seen from the company’s perspective, by specifying the 
meaning, aim and self-image actively. It therefore differs from image, which is the customers approach to the 
brand. Identity precedes over image as companies must know what to send before they project it to the 
public. Only by knowing what to send can brands become independent and create an individual meaning. 
This secures a focus on essence rather than appearance, which is a more long lasting perspective to branding. 
The brand identity should be consistent over time (Aaker 2002b). Nevertheless, strategic and market 
circumstances motivates businesses to enter new segments which can lead to a paradox of the brand identity 
if the extension is not done properly. Kapferer (2004) states that brand development and extensions are 
necessary for companies to stay competitive in a changing environment in order to generate growth and 
profitability, but a crucial point is that the core of the brand doesn’t change. It is the degree of freedom 
between identity and positioning which determines the potential brand change over time, while at the same 
time staying true to oneself.  
 
 %		
The identity derives from several different reservoirs. Brands, seldom derives an identity of its own. Rather 
the identity is an ongoing process, which develops both consciously and unconsciously. However a strong 
focus on brand identity from the very beginning, companies can become proactive in their desired 
development of their image. This calls for more attention to the sending side of branding. (Kapferer 2004)    
 
The first source of identity relates to the products. From the very beginning these convey the plan and 
uniqueness of the corporation. This part of the identity however does not only relate to the products in a strict 
sense. Moreover the production and distribution processes and offered services are elements which will 
reflect the identity. This way, both intangible and tangible elements of the product adds to the brand identity. 
The values underlying such product related actions, must suit the core of the product. Intangible and tangible 
elements are interrelated, as values drive reality and reality on the other hand manifests such values. (Aaker 
2002b) 
 
Identity will likewise be born out of the geographical and historical roots of the corporation. Among other 
brands has its own culture, which becomes central for the identity. Such culture derives from the basic 
governing principles of the corporation. Brands are however not only driven by culture, but also convey it. 
Country of origin here plays an essential role of the culture, whether it is directly communicated or not. 
Some brands base part of their uniqueness upon the country of origin, while others try to hide it. This is often 
a very conscious decision. Where it can benefit some, it can also be a harmful or unimportant part of the 
identity for others. The earliest founding acts of the corporation are also many times leaving a long-reaching 
impact. The founder and the first products, distribution channels, communication and places are here 
elements which often influence the identity heavily.  
 
Brand origin is defined as the place, region or country, which a brand is perceived to belong to by its target 
markets. Some brands may even take advantage of their national origin, or try to make the consumers believe 
that the brand origins from a favourable nationality. Consumer perceptions may differ from reality due to 
ignorance, lack of salience of origin for a certain brand or deliberate manipulation from the manufacturer to 
disguise their actual origin. (Thakor and Lavack 2003) 
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Sholofsky (1987) argues that a brands origin has an influence on the perceived image and that the related 
credibility of the origin consequently is important for a global brand. Aaker (1991) introduces the concept of 
default origin of a brand. The concept highlights that a brand is influenced and related to the country where 
the brand first started to do business. In other words, even if a brand tries to disguise its true origin, there will 
always be some link to it, which can be traced. 
 
Plummer (1985) argues that brand image consists of three different variables; brand personality, product 
attributes and consumer benefits. Batra et al (1993) elaborated on the concept of brand personality and 
underlined that demographics of a brand are often the most salient personality characteristic. 
 
An article by Baker and Ballington (2002) is arguing that the origin matters in the global environment 
companies are facing today. Due to the raise of internationalization and increased competition companies are 
having more difficulties creating sustainable competitive advantage, why a brands origin can work as an 
alternative approach to create a sustainable advantage. 
 
In the case where the product brand name is the same as the corporate name, the brand becomes a sort of 
spokesperson for the corporation, and there therefore has to be a relationship between the brand identity and 
the corporate identity. If the product brand name is unrelated to the corporate name, it leaves more freedom 
for the corporation to create a brands identity of the respective product. The model below suggests that 
corporate named brands have/or should have the same culture as the companies who owns them. 
 
Figure  2 Transfer of company identity to brand identity when company and brand names 
coincide (Kapferer 2004) 
As earlier described, identity precedes image. Image nevertheless remains a central concept in brand 
management. The whole purpose of branding is to create a preferred image – strong enough to result in a 
transaction. From the brand and its identity the customer decodes, extracts and interprets in order to come up 
with a “picture of the brand” – an image. Therefore image must be understood from where it derives which is 
from the eye of the beholder. In this way identity does not necessarily equals image – or at least in most 
cases it does not. In this way not only will an identity be judged by the single customer with his own 
characteristic and foundation for doing so, but the process of doing so will be influenced by different 
external factors such as competitors and so called noise (Kapferer 2004). In this way brand image refers to 
customer’s perception of a brand. Herzog (1963) argues that such image is the total sum of impressions, 
which customers obtain from several sources, which together form a brand personality. The central point in 
brand image is therefore that it is a customer constructed conception of a brand.         
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Figure  3 Identity and image (Kapferer 2004) 
Where brand identity originates from the corporation, with the purpose to create a unique and differentiated 
product, brand image relates to the customers perceptions and beliefs of the brand. Both are essential for 
creating a strong brand and congruence between them is necessary in order to enhance brand loyalty 
(Nandan 2005).  
However such link is not a matter of course. In an increasingly complex and over-communicated marketing 
environment it is very likely that the brand identity created by corporation and the brand image which is 
created by the customers perception, is out of tune. This happens if a communication gap exists between the 
encoding and the decoding processes. As people will respond differently to brands, be influenced by 
different sources and use their own interpretations of brands, it is all the more important that the brand 
message is communicated clearly and consistently. (Nandan 2005)  
 
It is therefore central that a connection between the brand and the customer is created. Such connection must 
be based upon dialogue and customized interactions, which relates customer needs, motivations and dreams 
to the core benefits of the brand. An effective communication is essentially expressing the essence of the 
brand in such a way that the consumption experience matches the purchase expectations. Interpretive 
communication, which focuses on the receiver side rather than the source, is one way to improve the linkage 
between brand identity and brand image. With the goal to make sure that the meaning assigned to a brand by 
an organisation (brand identity), is shared by the customer (brand image), this type of communication will 
enhance long-term interaction between brand and customer. (Nandan 2005)      
 
 '

Awareness is not everything and enough to obtain long-term success. To be able to convince people of the 
brands values, emotions is a central element.  
For many brands, especially high involvement products, it is important not only to create awareness but also 
build emotional connection. Lynch and de Chernatony (2003) states, that development and communication 
of emotional brand values may enhance the potential value creation and can be a way to develop a 
sustainable differential and competitive advantage.  
 
When talking about brand emotions one has to be careful not to mix it together with brand awareness. Some 
products can be well known and thereby have a high awareness among costumers, while other less known 
brands may be loved and adored. Emotional brands are argued to be loved, communicate a clear and defined 
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internal culture and finally have a language that reflects a unique vision in visual, verbal and sensory terms. 
(Gobé 2003) 
 
The relationship between consumers and brand can be experienced differently from consumer to consumer 
and brand to brand and can best be understood by the head, heart or gut theory. Head is referring to rational 
and practical buying arguments. Heart refers to feelings and ethics and finally gut relates to inspiration. A 
brand should have a mix of all of them, but depending on the product often has an emphasis on one more 
then the other (Gobé 2003). Gobé (2001) claims that the emotional aspects of products will create the main 
difference together with the price that will motivate loyalty. Gobé (2001) argues that emotional branding is a 
mean of creating personal dialogues with consumers. Consumers expect brands to know them on an 
individual level, with a solid understanding of their needs and cultural orientation. The future of branding is 
listening carefully to people in order to connect powerfully by bringing pleasurable, life-enhancing solutions 
to their world. Hence, brands will have to focus on providing strong emotional content in their marketing. 
 
 	&	
The importance of reputation is increasingly becoming a managerial concern. This happens not only on the 
product brand level but moreover also on a corporate level. Where distinct product differentiation 
increasingly becomes more difficult to obtain, many companies use their own identity to build up brand 
personality (Jones 2005). Thus many companies, with a historical product brand focus, have initiated 
corporate branding initiatives. They have found the corporate reputation to be important in order to achieve 
business goals and stay competitive (Argnenti and Druckenmiller 2004). Thus, many companies have found 
corporate brands to be an important tool, which can provide credibility to new products and to various 
stakeholders under the changing dynamics of today’s market. (Argnenti and Druckenmiller 2004) A 
corporate brand is thus a brand which spans an entire company. It can be aspirational, and will express what 
the corporation will deliver with respect to products, services, experiences and how this is done. Successful 
corporate branding implies a shared set of coherent statements about the values of the corporation aimed at 
its various stakeholders over time (Morsing and Kristensen 2001). Corporate branding involves the identity 
of the entire company and not just of its products. It is therefore not only what the products stands for, but 
moreover the entire organisation. Besides product values, standpoints with respect to ethics, employees, 
customers, suppliers, environment etc. hereby becomes central. As consumers are concerned about their own 
identity, which they connect closely to their consumption practices, they seek more than mere functionality, 
but increasingly meanings and good stories. This puts pressure on companies in order to communicate 
clearly about their corporate distinctiveness. In this way corporate branding can be regarded as a way to use 
visions and cultures as part of the marketing.      
 
With the aim to develop a strong reputation, companies makes corporate brands, by making actions, values 
and missions more salient and spread certain added values. On a corporate level, reputation takes the 
company as a whole, and reunifies all stakeholders and functions. The importance of corporate brands relates 
to a world where people increasingly react to names, reputations, rumours and word of mouth. This calls for 
corporate brands which speak on behalf of the company and draw attention to its presence and actions. 
(Kapferer 2004) 
 
In a time where public confidence in business is low and scrutiny is high, managing the corporate brand and 
its communication, means managing the profile towards multiple stakeholders. (Argenti and Druckenmiller 
2004, Kapferer 2004) This necessitates a stronger focus on building and maintaining a strong reputation. The 
reputation relates to the collective representation of the multiple perceived images. Keller (2000) 
consequently also argues, that strong corporate brands, is based upon stakeholders’ coherently positive 
perception of the corporate brand.  
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Reputation is thus the average perceived image of the corporation from an overall stakeholder perspective. It 
is therefore built up over time, and is based on the identity, performance and appearance of the corporation 
and how the public based on these and other factors has perceived the corporation. (Argenti and 
Druckenmiller 2004) Whereas a corporation can define and communicate its identity and brand, the image 
and reputation results from peoples perceptions of the corporation’s behaviour, and are therefore less within 
direct control of the corporation (Argenti and Druckenmiller 2004). This puts even more focus on the 
management of identity and brands, as a conscious and consistent behaviour here which is in tune with the 
various stakeholders, is the only way to obtain a desirable image and reputation. Central for this is that 
customers continually get what they expect, whereby the brand promise is kept, and thereby the reputation 
strengthened. (Argnenti and Druckenmiller 2004) A strong linkage, therefore exist between identity/branding 
and image/positioning. Consequently, companies are increasingly found to incorporate many of the factors 
which influence the reputation in the branding, such as corporate social responsibility etc. (Argnenti and 
Druckenmiller 2004) As stated by Wally Olins: “brands of the future will have to signal something 
wholesome about the company behind the brand. The next big thing in brands is social responsibility” (The 
Economist 2001).    
 
In order to reap the benefits of branding and obtain reputation, brands must have its own specific point of 
view. It is such specific point of view, or more accurately the customer’s perception of it, which justifies the 
brands existence. Corporate brand strategy therefore consists in defining the absolute necessity of the brand – 
its raison d’être. It is therefore the common spirits, vision and ideals behind and within the brand, which 
unifies the corporate brand rather than common external signs. (Nandan 2005) 
 
A brand is to be seen as the memory and the future of its products. Therefore corporate brands must stay true 
to them selves in order to build customer loyalty. It is central to emphasize a consistent brand identity in 
order for customers to develop a coherent and related brand image. It is only through a consistent behaviour 
that brands can live up to their very purpose and act as differentiators, which offers customers associations, 
emotions and security by acting as risk and time reducers. Such consistency should be able to stand the test 
of time, by letting the brand/product develop without changing such fundamental values. (Nandan 2005, 
Kapferer 2004)  
 
 %(	)	
 *					+((

All stakeholder groups have influencers, which are referred to as opinion leaders. An essential brand 
questions one has to ask, is who will influence the group rather than thinking of whole market segments. The 
idea of this is that if a brand can get the support and interest from the opinion leaders it will influence the 
whole segment to which this opinion leader is symbolizing. The brand has to understand these opinion 
leaders and present them selves as being on their team and sharing their values. 
 
Valette Florence (2004) has suggested that opinion leaders are characterized by three fundamental traits, why 
they are perceived as experts, have charisma and a desire to be different and finally have high social 
visibility. 
 
Richins (1983) has researched how dissatisfied customers potentially react, and how this could influence a 
corporation. He stresses that dissatisfied customers potentially could impact a corporation in three different 
ways of actions by switching brands, making a complaint or tell others about dissatisfying experiences. To 
tell others about dissatisfying experiences is what is referred to as negative word-of-mouth. The potential 
impact a negative response from a customer can have on a corporation is significant. If the number of 
dissatisfied customers is high enough the impact could very well have a lasting effect in terms of negative 
 7	89	 					$:	 
 21 
image and reduced sales. On the other hand positive experiences, is likely to bring positive word of mouth. 
In an over communicated marketing environment, this is one of the effective marketing tools. People are thus 
increasingly found to be influenced by word-of-mouth rather than corporate controlled marketing actions 
(Kotler 2000).   
 
 
		
Consumer culture theory is an essential element for brand managers in order to understand what appeals and 
triggers consumers to purchase certain brands. It has for a long time been accepted that consumption was 
about showing social status through conspicuous consumption, indicating wealth. (Veblen, 1975). Bourdieu 
(1984) disagreed with such reasoning, and argued that there was more to the concept of social class than 
wealth. He added culture capital as a variable to Veblen’s theory, and thereby suggested that consumers 
demonstrate more than just wealth in respect to what they consumed. The culture capital variable, indicates 
that consumers want to tell something more specific about them selves e.g. how educated one is, or reflect 
ones ethical and/or moral believes. 
 
Another author who supports Bourdieu is Maffesoli (1996). He argues that our society can be described as 
being post-modernist. This is important to understand, because it puts light on how goods are used 
symbolically. Our society today in the developed world has moved from people belonging to big social 
classes to more individualistic lifestyle. The argument supporting this is saying that goods and thereby 
brands are working as signs, for individual consumers to purchase and thereby sending messages about their 
way of living to its environment (Corrigan, 2005). “Instead of consuming the goods themselves, we consume 
the meanings of goods as constructed though advertisement and display” (Featherstone 1991) 
 
 %))	
	
The involvement factor indicates the relation a customers has to a certain brand and their buying behaviour. 
Kotler et al (2004) identify four types of buying behaviour, which is defined by the level of involvement and 
differentiation in the product category. 
 
Figure  4 Buying behaviour (Kotler et al 2004) 
The model intend to create a picture of consumers buying behaviour, which in the case of complex decision 
making involves more interest and consideration, whereas habitual buying decisions are significant less 
influenced personally involved. Kotler et al (2004) is primarily stressing that whether a product is high or 
low involvement depends on the economical risk and self expression which is related to a given product. 
However, it is essential to realize that a product can represent a relative high involvement even if it does not 
Low involvement High involvement 
Significant differences 
between brands 
Few differences 
between brands 
 
Complex buying 
behaviour 
 
Variety-seeking 
buying behaviour 
 
Dissonance- 
reducing buying 
behaviour 
 
Habitual buying 
behaviour 
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involve economical risk. Bloch and Richins (1983) presented three variables which has influence on 
customer involvement. Personal involvement relates to an inherent interest, values as well as other needs 
which motivate a purchase.  
Physical involvement refers to characteristics of the product that increase differentiation and thereby increase 
the customer interest. Situational involvement relates to temporary increases in relevance or interest towards 
a product. 
Gilles and Kapferer (1985) underlines that depending on the involvement of a certain product, consumers 
may be either passive or active when they receive advertisement messages. By this he expresses, that 
consumers with high involvement are more likely to have an interest and an opinion, whereas low 
involvement products are characterized by low interest.  
 
 %
		)	
We discussed the concept of identity, and it is important to underline that it implies that some facets, has to 
be identical over time. Nevertheless, a brand to some degree has to change if not to loose its relevance, 
which is determined by the changing market environment. The challenge for companies is how to change 
and adapt to the ever changing market without undermining the essential values in their brand identity. Some 
of the environmental changes managers have to consider are how society changes over time. Due to 
economical development and globalization the ways consumers are consuming has changed. Today 
consumers are not satisfied with big and large brands, instead they want better brands. This naturally has an 
impact on what a brand has to communicate to appeal to consumers depending. (Kapferer 2004) 
 
Therefore, due to the fact that consistency in the brand identity is very important and the need to adapt to 
different and changing market environments, brand managers are put into a dilemma.  
Another thing a brand manager should consider, when faced with this dilemma of identity and diversity, is to 
dig down deep into the brand and determine its specific identity. More precise, what is the brands kernel? 
(the source of its identity), what characterizes the attributes that are necessary for the brand to remain true?, 
and what are the traits that can show some flexibility are? (Kapferer 2004) 
 
When a corporation decides to go international, they have to consider various elements regarding their brand. 
They have to ask themselves to what extent they what to be coherent with their national brand or if they what 
to adapt local markets. In the literature of international marketing, the issue of global advertisement and 
branding is discussed. There are various opinions regarding whether global brands really can exist or to what 
extent they can be globalized. There are powerful arguments why it is profitable to standardise all products 
and communications in the markets where an organisation operates. On the other hand, we are living in a 
world full of different economies and cultures, and this is putting a limit to what extent products and brands 
can be standardised (Ghauri and Cateora 2005).  Quelch and Hoff (1986) are suggesting that it is essential for 
corporations to adapt to the different environments in the respective markets where they operate, whereas 
Levitt (1983) on the other to large extent should standardize products and brands. Nevertheless, a more 
resent study by Kapferer (2005) is taking neither the side of Quelch and Hoff or Levitt, but argues that 
companies should aim at a selective globalization of brands. He underlines that global brands should not 
forget that business also must be local. Discussing global brands, it has been argued, that consumers prefer 
global brands to signal that they belong to the global culture. Nevertheless, a study conducted by Alden et al. 
(1999) concluded that this was not the case, and showed that consumers motive to buy global brands were 
their perception of these brands to be of higher quality, and secondly the associated prestige. Nonetheless, 
neither of these effects was as strong for the ethnocentric consumers who were more focused on the national 
value of a brand.  
 
An essential question for brand managers is how to make their global brands fit with the complex diversity 
of the world in terms of culture, norms, economy and legislation. A corporation might be forced to adapt to 
some of these differences to fit in a certain market. Kapferer (2004) is underlining that brand managers 
should be aware of the real value and cultural differences in perceptions in the world. A trend among 
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younger consumers is to consume brands with strong national identities. The claim rests upon the argument 
that we are more and more affected by mixed culture in our everyday lives, and we therefore tend to prefer 
brands with a strong national identity to express our own personal identity. (Kapferer 2004) 
 
 				)	
Clarkson (1995) argues that companies should act responsibly towards groups who have a direct or indirect 
influence on the corporation’s activities. These groups are called stakeholders and can be divided into four 
main categories: 
 
• Organisational – employees, customers, shareholders and suppliers 
• Community – local residents and special interest groups 
• Regulatory – municipalities and regulatory systems 
• Media  
 
Stakeholders can have a positive as well as a negative effect on the corporation by contributing with, or 
withholding resources (Grant et al 1991). Dunfee et al (1999) introduces the concept of conflicting norms 
among different stakeholder groups, which can lead to disputes affecting the corporation. Nevertheless the 
general contact involves broad macro social norms, referred to as hypernorms, which captures a small and 
general set of principles which is morally right or wrong. These hypernorms provide the normative ground 
rules of a secondary set of norms among specific stakeholder communities. Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) 
concludes that strategic business units, professional associations and nations are examples of communities, 
which embrace their own norms and values questioning what is right and wrong. Furthermore, Donaldson 
and Dunfee (1994) view an individual corporation as having its own norms and values. These norms should 
overlap, be influenced by, and influence the norms of stakeholder communities which interact with the 
corporation. In the lack of sufficient overlap and mutual influence, this might lead to potential stakeholder 
actions against the corporation.  
 
By looking at the various stakeholders the corporation can identify primary and secondary stakeholders. 
Such identification shows which stakeholders affect the brand generally and which only does so in relation to 
specific issues (Beailieu and Pasquero 2002). Based on such categorisation, the stakeholders can be 
prioritised according to their brand influence (Jones 2005). Mitchell et al (1997) adds to stakeholder theory 
illustrating three factors of influence; stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency. Power is defined by 
stakeholders’ ability to exercise power over the corporation and other stakeholder communities. Legitimacy 
defines what is socially accepted and can help the stakeholders to make their claims count. Finally, urgency 
is how time-sensitive the issue is, and sets the stage for the dynamics that focuses on addressing and 
resolving the issue.  
 
Customers want to be heard and express their opinions. Therefore advertising is not sufficient to build a 
strong brand, because it’s a one-way communication channel. A customer relationship with a brand 
automatically creates a need of dialogue between them and the brand or corporation. If the dialogue between 
the brand and the customer is managed well, and the customer feels that his or hers opinion is important, it 
can lead to customers who are committed and loyal. On the other hand, a brand can for resource related 
reasons not handled every individuals demand for dialogue, but instead aim at developing a general picture 
of the market segment and its opinions. 
 
Hill and Jones (1992) underline three different stakeholder actions to demonstrate and push through their 
issues. These are legalistic approaches, exit strategies and voice strategies. With these types of actions 
stakeholder communities can demonstrate their influence on the focal corporate activities. 
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Stakeholder theory illustrates that companies as brands are directly affected by actions of various 
stakeholders, which traditionally is not considered in branding theory. Stakeholder theory thus illustrates that 
companies is reliant on a network of relationships and obliged by these to various degrees. Each stakeholder 
will normally have different primary concerns and objectives regarding the brand. It can therefore be argued 
whether the brand only is concerned with the customer perceptions. (Jones 2005) A stakeholder perspective 
offers a long term approach to brand value and not a more short termed  approach as when only customers is 
focused upon. The stakeholder perspective offers a more holistic view to branding and a richer picture of the 
sources which creates value and influence the brand. Concretely the stakeholder perspective calls for an 
identification of the stakeholders which can influence or is being influenced by the achievement of corporate 
purposes. Brand value is created by addressing the various stakeholders through interaction between brand 
and stakeholder. (Jones 2005)    
 
! 		
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is based on the idea that companies have a social responsibility. An 
ideal social responsible organisation acts according to or even exceeds the ethical, legal, commercial and 
public expectations that stakeholders have (Grant, 1991). Being social responsible has to be motivated by an 
authentic will to do good (Swanson, 1995). Nevertheless Friedman (1970) claims, that companies only 
should use CSR to protect their own economical responsibility towards shareholders. Thereby, Freidman 
argues that companies should take care of the stakeholders, but the overall goal is to satisfy the shareholders. 
One could have an endless discussion about if companies are truly socially responsible or if they are only 
acting according to their economical interest, but both perspectives accept and realises the threat of 
stakeholders and how CSR can minimize this threat.  
 
The advantages of corporations implementing CSR practises aligned with stakeholder norms minimises risk 
and improves the likelihood that stakeholders continue to provide necessary resources for the organisation. 
This encourages the creation of bonds between the organisation and its stakeholder communities. (Maignan 
2004) 
  
Furthermore, Maignan et al (2005) states that companies can’t satisfy all stakeholders, due to limited 
resources and conflicting norms and values in different stakeholder communities. This makes CSR a difficult 
issue for companies because one specific corporate decision can positively affect one stakeholder community 
while at the same time have a negative impact on another stakeholder community. Nevertheless according to 
Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) conflicting communities can coexist as long as they are in line with the 
hypernorms. 
 
Corporations should identify the most critical stakeholders and take social responsible actions to satisfy their 
desires and values, and align it with the core values of the organisation, otherwise the corporate identity will 
diminish (Grant 1991, Topalian 2003). 
Responsibility include having and adapting certain norms and ethics which stakeholders value or even 
demand from corporations today. Snyder et al. (2006) discusses how organisations communicated ethics are 
put to the test during a crisis, and how an organisations ethical identity is viewed depending on how they 
address the issue. A crisis challenge how explicit and organisation and its management are committed to 
their official norms. During normal circumstances it can be difficult for stakeholders to judge to what degree 
a corporation it devoted to their values, or if they actually exclusively are concerned with profit. Nonetheless, 
a crisis can put so much strain to a corporation that they have to compromise on their highly held values. The 
conclusion of Snyder’s et al. (2006) study, argued that the way persons are judged by their actions when they 
are under pressure can be referred to organisations as well. In other words, an corporation’s behaviour during 
a crisis will determine its ethical integrity.  
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Corporate crises have always been part of business life. However, due to increasing globalization, corporate 
conglomeration and stakeholder influence, crises have become more frequent and comprehensive. In this 
way, crises can vary in scale, scope and nature. In general, we can distinguish between four different types of 
crises; internal-normal, internal-abnormal, external-normal and external-abnormal. (Snyder et al 2006)  
 
The internal-normal crisis is with respect to timing and magnitude the most predictable of the four and can 
be expected to occur more often. Because it is more predictable and internal it is relatively uncomplicated to 
prepare for the crisis and maybe even solve the issue before a crisis ever appear.  
 
An internal-abnormal crisis originates internally in an organisation and can be categorized as being rare but 
at the same time unpredictable in respect to timing and magnitude. Because it is rare and unpredictable it is 
not possible for corporations to pre-plan a response. However since the crisis is internal, the timing of 
response can vary depending on the urgency of the issue.  
 
The external-normal crisis originates outside the organisation and is relatively predictable with respect to 
magnitude and timing. Even though, because the crisis originates outside the organisation the predictability 
is reduced compared with the internal-normal crisis. The crisis can affect more than one organisation.  
 
An external-abnormal crisis originates outside the organisation and is unpredictable regarding timing and 
magnitude. Therefore, it is not possible to scan the environment in the hope of foreseeing and preventing a 
crisis in respect to the economical resources needed to do this efficiently. When this type of crisis occurs it 
could affect the equilibrium between corporations. In such situation where the environment changes, the 
corporations strategy has to change as well. First mover effect is significant in these situations and affected 
corporations therefore have to take fast and well evaluated strategic decisions. Therefore, it is essential to 
prepare for such crisis before it hits, in order to respond fast. To improve the outcome of such crisis 
corporations will benefit by making their strategic decision based on ethical arguments. 
 
Snyder et al. (2006) furthermore introduces the concept of ethical rationality in crisis situations. It suggests 
that corporations by using ethics as a strategic foundation in decision making, could put the organisation in a 
better position compared with traditional rationalisation. 
 
# 
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The purpose of communication during a crisis is to influence stakeholder’s perception of ones organisation 
and to protect the image from damage (Ray 1999). Protecting ones image can be done by modifying public 
perceptions of responsibility for the crisis or aim to control the impressions of the organisation itself 
(Coombs 1999). Ray (1999) further argues that communication in a crisis situation can be used to inform, 
convince or motivate certain stakeholder initiatives. Sturges (1994) argues that communication is essential 
and a central element is damage control in order to prevent severe negative reactions in the corporate 
environment. Lerbinger (1997) is introducing a secondary objective in respect to crisis communication. This 
objective is about communicating corporate missions, values and operations to the environment. 
 
When corporations are considering what message strategy is appropriate in a certain crisis, central elements 
are  primary stakeholders, the type of crisis, available evidence, severity of damage, the corporations 
performance history, and legal issues (Coombs, 1999). Additionally, a corporation’s perceived credibility is 
significant. Corporations that are perceived to be credible in the eyes of the stakeholders are more likely to 
be trusted and forgiven.  
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Coombs (1995) developed a five stages strategic communication model, which aim is to help corporations in 
a crisis situation to choose and appropriate response strategy. The model describes five different crisis 
communication strategies; non-existence, distance, integration, mortification, suffering.  
 
The non-existence strategy tries to eliminate the threat of the crisis by denying its existence, clarifying that 
no crisis exist, attaching a more aggressive strategy, or use ones position to intimidate others who are less 
powerful. 
 
The distance strategy is intended to weaken the link between the corporation and the crisis. By doing so the 
organisation acknowledges that a crisis exists, anyway they try to make excuses or justify the crisis. By 
excusing, corporations minimize the responsibility by denying intentionally to have caused the crisis. This 
could be by blaming others for the situation. Corporations who are addressing a crisis by justifying it is 
trying to convince an audience that the crisis is not that serious or claiming that the crisis was 
misrepresented. 
 
In an integration strategy the central point is to find a way to get the public approval, by for example taking 
advantage of ones established corporate image, transcending the crisis to a more desirable position, and talk 
well about others to get their approval.  
 
The mortification strategy aims at winning forgiveness and develop acceptance. This could be done by 
offering compensation to the victims and thereby gain forgiveness. Further, this strategy is clearly sending 
signals that similar situations will not happen again. 
 
The suffering strategy is aiming at portraying the organisation as the victim rather than a felon, and thereby 
gets sympathy from the stakeholders.  
 
After the study where the introduced message strategies was introduced, Coombs (1999) has elaborated and 
added two more strategies to the five above. The first one is named salience, where corporations are 
addressing a crisis situation by being passive. The second is referred to as endorsement of external expert, 
and is a good way to boost corporation’s credibility when they are in the middle of a crisis. The experts’ role 
could be to approve the organisation and the way it is dealing with the issue. Coombs (1999) finally claims 
that the best way for corporations in a crisis to protect their image is to modify the perception of the 
stakeholders who are responsible for the crisis, if it is possible. 
 
, %
The term boycott in the context of business, can be defined as “the concerted, but non-mandatory, refusal by 
a group of actors (the agents) to conduct marketing transactions with one of more other actors (the target) 
for the purpose of communicating displeasure of certain target policies and attempting to coerce the target 
to modify those policies” (Garrett 1987).  
Boycotts are distinguished from other influential actions placed upon companies, such as embargoes, 
divestment and individual preferences, as it deals with the organised refusal to do marketing transactions 
based on purely social pressure to encourage participation (Garrett 1987). 
  
Boycott can take many forms, thus we can distinguish between obstructionist, secondary and surrogate 
boycotts. Surrogate boycotts refers to actions towards political entities such as nations and states (Mills 
1996). Hence it deals with a protest groups which finds itself dissatisfied with the public policies of a city, 
state or nation and acts accordingly by boycotting surrogates. This is an increasingly used boycott, and the 
one with most effect especially towards what can be termed innocent targets. The rational behind surrogate 
boycotters’ actions is end-justifying-means. Because the end justifies the means, many neutrals and innocent 
will potentially be affected by such a boycott. (Friedman 2001)     
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Boycotts may differ widely, but in general two justifications can be identified. A strategic justification is 
based on activists perception of offensive practises conducted by companies, whereas integrity-based 
justifications relates to practises which has become offensive only through their association with other 
parties which is seen offensive (Mills 1996).  
 
The concrete orientation of the boycott can be carried out in two different ways. Either as a market boycott, 
concerned with the influence of agents to retain from purchasing goods from the target. Or as a media 
boycott, which increasingly is seen as a feasible way, where the focus is placed on influencing the media in 
order to humiliate targets, and thereby cover the boycotters concerns and goals. (Friedman 1999).  
   
The potential of a boycott is naturally depending on participation, which can vary greatly and is determined 
by several factors. Awareness is central for a boycott to come about in the first place. Moreover, the values 
and goals of participant are important in order to line up behind a boycott. Likewise social pressure, limited 
personal costs and the support of a highly credible leader will influence participation. (Garrett 1987) 
 
In relation to boycott and other occasions where a corporation is threatened it is appropriate to discuss the 
concept of bargaining power introduced by Porter (1985), as it puts light on the issue on how corporations 
are likely to be affected by such threat. In B2B markets the focal corporation is often in a stronger position 
regarding its customers in comparison with B2C corporations. This is because it is less risky and complicated 
to switch e.g. a shoe brand than it is to switch supplier in respect to cost, competition and operation. 
Nevertheless, even within B2C markets, corporations can have relatively high bargaining power over 
consumers as a result of available substitutes and brands. 
In boycott situations three different variables influence the potential outcome and development of such an 
act.  
 
First is the economic pressure of the agent that can create financial hardship for the target. This is of course 
of major importance and the economic pressure could also increase if the agents increase the number of 
constituents such as consumer, labour and political groups (Garrett 1987). From an agent perspective 
boycotts can be considered social dilemmas where the self-interest of withholding consumption is matched 
with the cost of engaging in the boycott and the uncertain utility gained. Individual costs relates to the 
intrinsic preference of the product and the availability of substitute products (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). In 
most cases, consumers will be better of withholding consumption, unless the majority participates in a 
boycott thereby reducing the likelihood of failure, social risks and costs. The higher the likelihood of 
participation and concrete action from agents, the higher the potential economic pressure will be. (Friedman 
2001)  
 
Image pressure results from the undesirable publicity for the target which a boycott announcement can create 
- no matter how justified the agents claim might be. Such potential exist even in cases where the actual 
economic threat of the boycott might be low (Garrett 1987). This image pressure is increasingly becoming of 
importance as corporations move towards a more public image orientation (Guzzardi 1985, Balmer and 
Greyser 2003). Thus many boycotts today take more of a media oriented perspective because of its relative 
easiness and the difficulties related to engaging in an effective economic boycott (Friedman 2001).  
 
Policy commitment relates to the resistance that the target has and acts upon at the outset of a boycott as the 
response to the agents’ actions. Such commitment can be based on the different targets reasons and interests 
(Garrett 1987). Reasons for high policy commitment can be a perception of illegitimacy and little 
understanding of agent’s complaints and demands, as well as the costs related to policy modifications (Sen 
and Bhattacharya 2001). In cases with high policy commitment the target will feel less receptive towards the 
potential economic and image pressure from a potential boycott.  
 
These variables are heavily interlinked and have a positive correlation between economic pressure and image 
pressure. As the media coverage of the boycott will intensify, the image pressure will raise when more 
consumers become aware of the conflict and support this and thereby increase the economic pressure. 
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Moreover, will the media recognise the upsurge of the boycott activity as more consumers join, thereby 
increasing the image pressure. Negative correlation exist between policy commitment and the two forms of 
boycott pressure so that targets tend reduce their policy commitment when the potential pressure is high and 
agents tend to become dishearten and reduce their boycott eager when targets is perceived committed to their 
policies (Garrett 1987).    
 
From the above it is clear that a boycott will be most effective in situations with high economic and image 
pressure and where targets policy commitment is low.  Based on the estimated pressure from the economic 
and the image factors which the boycott could provide and the agents desire to change policies based on their 
commitment, four strategic implications can be visualised. 
 
 
Figure  5 Strategic options for boycott target (Garrett 1987) 
Policy modifications with a warning should be applied when the target has a low commitment and the 
boycott pressure is minimal. The target may comply with the sought changes by the agents but doing so also 
sending a clear message, that it’s not because of the fear the boycotts as this otherwise will encourage future 
boycotts. (Garrett 1987) 
 
The imperative for targets is not to forget that boycotts can cause significant pressure. When targets has 
limited policy commitment and perceive agents to have legitimate reasons for a boycott, leading to a high 
pressure, potential damage minimization should be sought. Therefore the target should as fast as possible 
change the policies, before the boycott can cause unnecessary damage. (Garrett 1987) 
  
In situations where the target has a high policy commitment and the pressure is relatively low, the target 
should keep a low profile, avoiding destructive behaviour which only can benefit the agents’ pressure. 
(Garrett 1987) 
 
Where the pressure potential is too great to ignore, and the policy commitment is very high a counterattack 
might be a feasible strategy. Here the target should attempt to act resolutely and consistent to influence and 
minimize the boycott and its support. (Garrett 1987) 
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It can be argued that we today have a finished world1, where companies need to gain social acceptance in 
order to exist. This is exemplified by the increasing focus on corporate branding whereby companies are 
expressing values and in order to gain customer acceptance (Klein 2005, Holt 2004). By claiming this, it is 
evident, that in gaining social acceptance, corporations need to argue for their raison d’être and their 
continuous policies in order to obtain long-term viability (Brønn 1998). Policies can thus be seen as a 
reasoning process, involving different stakeholders, which argues for perceptions and needs (Brønn 1998). 
This illustrate the ongoing reasoning process between stakeholders and corporations, where argumentation is 
the key, connecting the two sides. Arguing occurs when people state the not obvious, and anything that 
disrupts social order needs to be argued for (Toulmin 1958, Corvellec 2002). 
 
In a corporate context, argumentation is a matter of justification, with the aim to seduce and convince 
stakeholders (Sillince 1999). However this becomes complicated in a corporate setting, because 
argumentation is a knowledge based activity, where what one knows, might actually not be the truth, 
supported by evidence and often based on assumptions (Brønn 1998). This brings subjectivity into the 
argumentation, which means that different actors bring different views into the policy system which the 
corporation must relate and respond to (Mitroff et al. 1982). Therefore conformity can only be attained by 
rejecting or neglecting some of the claims put forward.    
 
One way which argumentation can become effective is to adapt to the particular context. In doing so, the 
arguer must select a particular combination of appropriate dimensions and rhetoric. Because people see the 
world as a set of contrast, rhetoric is a way of illustrating and creating such contrasts. They serve as bipolar 
rules of thumb, mottos or proverbs. Such rhetorical form is influenced by arguers meta-position on weather 
change is desired or not (Perelman and Oldbrechts-Tyteca 1958). Related to this, are the norms and values 
which is the basis of legitimacy and give the foundation to which degree argumentation can be persuasive. 
The degree of, and strength of these norms and values, determines the degree to which argumentations can 
be persuasive. In other words when hypernorms of the respective stakeholders are contradicting each other, 
disputes can be difficult to solve. In such case we can talk about positions of principles which collide. Here 
argumentation will never be able to lead to persuasion and influence, no matter how soundly based they 
might be (Corvellec 2006).
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4 Discussion 
Whoever in discussion adduces authority uses not intellect but memory. 
-Leonardo da Vinci  
 
 
The surrogate boycott of Denmark is, although perhaps the one who has received the most attention, only the 
latest from a phenomenon on the rise. Thus Boycott Quarterly in its final edition (Spring 1998) lists new 
surrogate boycotts of Australia, Ireland, Montana, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Wisconsin. The British 
consumer organisation Ethical Consumer, in May 2006 for various reasons lists Botswana, Burma, Canada, 
China and Israel as surrogate boycott targets. Additionally surrogate boycotts are at present at least called for 
Aruba, Muslim countries and the United States (Wikipedia 2006a).     
 
Etzioni’s (1969) observation of increasing militancy of social protest and that direct action is becoming “part 
of the daily routine of our democracy and its most distinctive mark.”, seems to be truer than ever. The 
increasing focus upon stakeholder management and social responsibility underpin such development, which 
has brought politics on the management agenda. This has spawned substantial interest into how companies, 
both directly and indirectly, behaves on the global stage. 
 
As surrogate boycotts, seems to be an increasingly used tool and an integrative part of the democracy, it is 
noteworthy that this specific consumer expression has received little or no practical and theoretical attention. 
Friedman already in 1985 pointed to the “special interest...of…the growing use of surrogate boycotts”. 
Despite growing interest in boycotts, this area largely has been neglected, or perhaps forgotten in the 
increasing interests in secondary boycotts. Due to the very characteristics of surrogate boycotts, it can be 
argued that this largely is out of direct management control and only hits companies in order to influence 
political offenders, which otherwise would be immune. Therefore no direct connection exists between 
corporate actions and policies and the offending politic, besides the geographical proximity. Nevertheless a 
surrogate boycott has a direct influence on corporations, not only in terms of the most obvious and 
immediate economical effect of sales, but moreover also on a long term basis by influencing the brand 
image. Surely such boycott, might on the surface seem unpredicted, unfair and even unmanageable, but this 
is no reason not to deal with such problem on a theoretical, and especially not practical level. We do believe 
that companies to some degree can act actively, both up to and under a surrogate boycott in order to reduce 
or even avoid its harmful potential. However, in order to do this, familiarity with surrogate boycott as a 
concept is needed.  
 
This section sets out to build a general understanding of surrogate boycotts from a theoretical perspective. By 
integrating and developing on different theoretical branches, we discuss surrogate boycotts from a general 
branding perspective. This serves as the background for the following analysis of the surrogate boycott of 
Arla, which should give practical implications, for the theory discussed and developed here. Therefore this 
section and the following analysis are closely related, and are respectively contributing with theoretical and 
practical knowledge of surrogate boycotts.  
 
In order to develop such theoretical understanding three elements is of central importance. These are; the 
characteristics of a surrogate boycott, and how they influence companies? How companies can act under 
surrogate boycotts? And finally how surrogate boycotts can be prevented? 
These questions are of central importance to develop a theoretical understanding of surrogate boycotts, and 
will be used as reference in the analysis of the surrogate boycott of Arla.                 
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In order to discuss this issue it is essential to get into the nature of surrogate boycotts. Surrogate boycotts can 
for corporations be difficult or even impossible to predict and prevent, as they are not the direct target, but 
rather the victim of a dispute between infighting external stakeholders. A surrogate boycott will not only put 
economical pressure on the boycotted corporation, but indirectly it has to be stressed that image pressure is 
significant, even if the organisation is not directly involved in the crisis. It may not be obvious that 
corporations could suffer under image pressure, when they are not being pressured due to their corporate 
actions. Nevertheless, brand literature stresses that a corporate image is not solely determined by tangible 
factors but also by intangible variables. It is significant to realise that deeper corporate identities are playing 
a role in such circumstances. These deeper corporate identities which could threaten a corporate brand could 
be related to their country of origin, the founder, political stand points and the corporation’s basic values and 
norms. As an example, if a corporation is affected by a surrogate boycott as a result of national reasons, the 
corporate brand will suffer in terms of the negative perceived image of their origin in the eyes of the 
boycotters. To sum up, a surrogate boycott will threaten an involved corporation economically and with 
respect to its perceived image.  
 
Figure  6 Surrogate boycott connection (own construction) 
The magnitude of the corporate pressure in a boycott situation is related to the boycotter’s influence, which 
is determined by their power, legitimacy and the situations urgency. In today’s society, media plays a 
significant role and is increasingly used by people and corporations with opinions which they want others to 
hear and take a stand on. This development equalizes the power relationship between the large corporations 
with profit interest and the smaller previously insignificant stakeholders who think that business has certain 
obligations such as e.g. being social responsible. If the media is interested in a certain issue, it can therefore 
awake significant awareness of a situation, which clearly can be threatening for a corporation. 
 
The level of involvement should be of corporate concern, when they evaluate how a threat as example a 
boycott may affect their brand, and furthermore, help corporations in respect to how they should act in such 
situation. We propose that involvement can relatively increase and decline depending on branding activities, 
corporate activities as well as external factors. The model below illustrates an example of how a corporations 
involvement can be affected by a boycott and moreover its response.   
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Figure  7 Involvement levels (own construction) 
A corporation trapped in a surrogate boycott and which products is perceived as being low involvement 
might be better of by staying neutral, because as the model shows it could maybe make the situation even 
worse. By avoiding attention, which maybe would increase negative increased involvement in the eyes of the 
corporation’s customers, could be the best way out of a conflict with minimal image damage. However, 
increased involvement can be both positive and negative for a corporation. Positive involvement is often 
created by the corporation as a result of internal actions e.g. branding, product attributes and corporate 
communication. Negative increased involvement could arise due to stakeholder dissatisfaction with a 
corporation which then can be related to the situational influence factor as the corporation temporarily is of 
interest. Therefore it has to be stressed that it is not possible to put a finger on which actions and situations 
will affect a corporations positive or negatively, as they are highly individual of nature. 
 
The problem with increased involvement is that it increases brand sensitivity. The more interest and thereby 
involvement there is concerning a corporation, the more attention it will attract and thereby have an influence 
on the perceived image. Therefore, depending on a corporation’s evaluation of a certain situation in respect 
to if a potential response will increase involvement negative or positively, a strategic approach to get out of 
the crisis should be taken. By this we mean, staying neutral or take a public stand to the situation if such 
action is believed to be beneficial for the corporate image.  
 
The following will discuss this further, by getting more into the essence of identity, image and stakeholders 
in order to get the bigger picture of how corporate brands are affected by pressure deriving from situations 
such as surrogate boycotts. What is of interest is to investigate and determine how these kinds of conflicts 
emerge in the first place? 
 
It is well recognised that the stakeholders of an organisation can have both positive as well as negative 
impacts on a brand. Whether certain stakeholders will affect an organisations corporate brand positively or 
negatively largely is determined by how well they identify them selves with the norms and values of the 
organisation. This can very well be understood by the concept of hypernorms, which stresses that a certain 
fundamental overlap of norms and values between corporations and its stakeholders have to exist. If this is 
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not the case, it can potentially lead to a situation where disagreeing stakeholders take action which might 
cause a threat. In a surrogate boycott situation this missing overlap has to be found in the variable which was 
the source for their relation to the external primary target which caused the boycott.  
 
A way to prevent stakeholders to take action, due to a lack of overlaps, is for corporations to listen and act 
according to stakeholders desires. Nevertheless, a corporation’s network of stakeholders is very complex, 
and conflicting expectations from individual stakeholders are unavoidable in the light of individual interests. 
This issue of conflicting stakeholder expectations becomes even more significant as brands are facing 
increasingly fragmented consumers as a result of our changing society as business increasingly is 
internationalized. Perceptions of what is right and wrong depend on values, culture and origin of the receiver. 
A second element which makes it difficult for corporations to adapt and act according to certain stakeholder 
expectations come into the picture when it conflicts with its basic corporate identity, which may not only be 
critical to change, but also hard or even impossible. 
 
Brand literature is suggesting that corporations should put its identity before its image. Identity is defined as 
how the corporation wants to be perceived, whereas image is how the corporations are perceived by their 
external stakeholders. Therefore, as image basically is what branding is all about this variable should not be 
neglected. These two variables identity and perceived image are seldom identical as the perceived image of a 
corporation is affected, not only by internal factors but by external as well. The external factors are referred 
to as noise, and it is largely out of corporate control. Even though the perceived image of a corporation can 
be difficult to control, corporations can through communication minimize the impact of noise. Image is 
created through stakeholder’s total sum of impressions and experiences with a brand. As people are likely to 
respond differently to brands, due to their individual experiences and various networks, they are creating 
their own interpretation of the brands. These interpretations are likely to be influenced by people’s basic 
values and needs. In other words, the perceived image of a corporation is not likely to be identical in respect 
to their diverse external stakeholders. Consumer culture theory can be related to this, by introducing the way 
consumers chose to create and signal their personal identity through their consumption patterns. Consumers 
are to a wider extent creating their own meaning about brands, and they consume inline with what they want 
to be viewed as by their environment. It could be argued that consumption, especially in the western world, 
is becoming a symbol of individual values and norms, which is putting business into a situation similar to a 
democracy. The figure below is created on behalf of this statement, and will work as a tool, to understand 
how a corporate image is perceived differently depending on the receiver. 
 
Figure  8 Stakeholder environment (own construction) 
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The model illustrates how corporate identity and corporate actions are communicating to its environment and 
thereby create a perceived image in respect to the receivers. However, the model further suggests that 
various stakeholders, depending on their relationship, values and norms, knowledge, expectations, culture 
and experiences of the focal corporation, are developing individual images of the brand. In other words, one 
stakeholder group can perceive a certain corporation as having a specific image, however, another 
stakeholder group, with another background, are likely to have a different picture of the same corporation. 
Finally, the model stresses that stakeholders are influencing one another. If these stakeholders, who are 
influencing a corporation, are external then it is largely out of corporate control.  These factors make it very 
difficult for corporations to create a specific image, not only because of the noise factor, but also due to the 
individual stakeholder expectations and background which influences and determines the brand image. 
 
In respect to surrogate boycotts, this model illustrates and can help to explain how such situation can come 
into existence and how the respective stakeholders are likely to influence the corporate image. For example, 
a corporation may be perceived by some stakeholders as being social responsible due to certain corporate 
initiatives or basic values, but on the other hand, on basis of the exact same initiatives this might not be 
approved by other stakeholders because it goes against what they believe to be appropriate, which may 
initiate a conflict, if the policy commitment is strong enough. What should be added to the model is the 
concept of opinion leaders. Nobody is totally individual in the way we perceive brands, and here is it that 
opinion leaders come into the picture. By identifying, influencing and controlling the opinion leaders 
corporations are in a better position to protect their brand from noise factors as well as minimizing the risk of 
a boycott. Nevertheless, as it is impossible to satisfy all stakeholders, it is likewise not possible to satisfy all 
opinion leaders. 
 
It was discussed in the literature review that emotional connections with brands are a source for consumer 
loyalty. The argument for this was that the connection simply is stronger between them and the corporation, 
which put the corporation in a special place in the consumers mind. On the other hand, these emotions can be 
reversed, which than has the exact upper sit effect. The worst stakeholders are those who really hate a brand. 
These stakeholders are likely to make complaints and talk with others about their hate-relationship with the 
brand. This negative response might have a significant impact on a corporation if the number of unsatisfied 
supporters is high enough. This is relevant according to the question of surrogate boycotts influence on 
corporate brands, as it helps to identify how strong the commitment from the stakeholders is in such situation 
and further, it will work as an indicator of how strong the image pressure is. For a brand to appeal to 
consumers on an emotional level it is important for the corporation to know the receivers needs and cultural 
orientation well.  
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Existing surrogate boycott literature is limited and simplified. We find need for specification in order to 
illustrate the complexity of such a situation. We therefore distinguish between two phases in surrogate 
boycott; the proactive and reactive.  
 
 
Figure  9 Boycott Phases (Own Construction) 
The proactive phase will address how corporations can avoid a surrogate boycott situation by acting 
according to different stakeholders’ norms and values. The proactive phase is critical to discuss because it 
can prevent an evolving issue to develop even further. In the light of image damage and threat of financial 
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loss, corporations will benefit from solving potential and developing disputes before they get out of hand. 
This has not been treated directly before in relation to surrogate boycotts. This is discussed further in the 
latter section. 
 
If corporations do not manage to solve upcoming dispute between the stakeholders a much more severe 
situation will develop. This will lead to what we define as a reactive phase of a surrogate boycott. This will 
call for much larger actions and initiatives from the corporation and will also lead to much more pressure. 
Here central elements become boycott management via the usage of communication, argumentation and 
concrete actions. 
 
As mentioned, a surrogate boycott situation occurs when the pressure on the corporation has resulted in 
concrete actions forcing either economic and/or image pressure upon the corporation. When confronted with 
a boycott situation, the corporation is according to theory expected to estimate the potential pressure the 
boycott can be expected to give based on the economic and image pressure which the stakeholders can 
impose. Further the corporation is expected to evaluate its policy commitment regarding the topic, which has 
lead to the boycott. From that, four general options are considered to be available. However the reasoning for 
those four options and the degree to which they can be applied can be questioned in the case of a surrogate 
boycott. The primary concern of this relates to the policy commitment aspect, as a corporation exposed to a 
surrogate boycott can be considered a more or less innocent victim caught between two external arguing 
parties. Therefore the corporation as such, can not in itself directly change the policy which has let to the 
surrogate boycott. Naturally it can to some degree influence the policy makers indirectly, via means such as 
e.g. lobbyism, however this to a limited and very situation specific degree. Another action related to the 
policy which is available for the corporation, is to take a position according to the concrete policy. This is not 
as such a policy change, but rather an argument broadly spanning from dissociation to association related to 
the given policy. Naturally the most common statement will be to make a clear dissociation to the policy, as 
nothing else will be expected to change the boycott opinion of the corporation. But as this in it self rarely 
leads to policy changes, it is unlikely that this will in it self lead to changes in the boycott, especially as the 
boycotters not is expected to change or stop the boycott before policy changes has been made.  
 
Furthermore the degree of pressure upon the corporation becomes more complex compared to more 
traditional boycotts, where it actually is a given corporate policy which leads to the boycott. This is so 
because, surrogate boycotts purely hits a corporation because of its association with a given political policy. 
Because of this the complexity of the boycott pressure increases. This is due to the origin from where the 
corporation officially operates and derives from. This puts the corporation in between its home market and 
the foreign market – which presumably are leading the boycott. This puts the corporation not only in a 
complex situation, but also a dilemma, because a stand for one of the sides will automatically mean distance 
taking from the other. By taking the side of the policy makers, which normally is founded in a democracy, 
thereby most often reflecting the general opinion, will lead to resentment from the boycotters side, which has 
potential to intensify and spread the boycott. On the other hand, an action for or supporting the boycotters 
side which has the potential to end the given boycott, will normally lead to resentment from the companies 
origin. This also has a negative potential, as it can lead to a domestic boycott instead, because of a feeling of 
lacking corporate commitment to domestic policies. Therefore the concrete pressure, from a surrogate 
boycott, has to be considered a balancing act where any action taken normally will have a negative impact on 
the corporation, and not just a positive. It is therefore essential that organisations are able to have overlaps in 
especially hypernorms in the markets where it operates. This should also be seen as an ongoing process of 
mutual influence, as stakeholders and organisation otherwise will move apart – threatening the long term 
viability. A final element which has to be discussed is how corporations deal with a surrogate boycott, and 
how this action will influence the corporate image. Corporations have recognised how they can minimize the 
threat from demanding stakeholders, by implementing social responsible policies into their identity. 
However, a crisis which is pressuring corporations to compromise on these communicated values will 
suddenly put their integrity to the test. Depending on what a corporation does when they are put under 
pressure, as for example in a surrogate boycott, situation, may have significant impact on the corporate 
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image. So not only is the boycott influencing the corporation, the actions taken on the background of the 
boycott, will also lead to reactions and influence from the environment.   
 
We can therefore due to the economic and image pressure rather talk about market shift potential in surrogate 
boycotts, and not just market loss, which is the normal case in traditional boycotts. Therefore the concrete 
pressure in surrogate boycott has to be related to the different markets where the corporation operates and 
their position towards the political policy bringing the boycott about. We therefore argue that surrogate 
boycott pressure should be seen as potential market shifts which can occur. Such shifts can based on the 
boycotters, other stakeholder, the corporation and their respective actions, occur over various time horizons. 
Therefore companies have to identify their key markets and the key stakeholders influencing the operation 
here. High boycott in pressure in relative terms will therefore only occur in situations where the boycotting 
markets/stakeholders have a higher market share than the markets which in overall terms support the given 
policy, or have the potential to intensify or spread the boycott in terms of economical and image related ways 
out of tune with the corporate strategy, thereby threatening the very survival. Adding to this complexity is 
the degree of commitment for and against the given policy. In this way companies will have easier to neglect 
and act against an opinion which does not have very high commitment.  
 
As discussed above, a surrogate boycott is of great complexity for the exposed corporation. Hence, the 
theoretical foundation yet presented by scholars in this matter is not really applicable and credible in these 
situations. We therefore propose a different theoretical approach to handle such matter from a corporate 
branding perspective. This is based on the before mentioned elements in surrogate boycotts, namely the 
degree of policy commitment of the affected parties and the relative market importance of those. In this 
context we therefore find the boycott pressure a central element. In the case of surrogate boycott, the 
pressure is distinguished from the model presented by Garrett (1987) as to include not only image and 
economic pressure, but also the degree of commitment of the boycotters. In a surrogate boycott we see 
commitment of stakeholders in the affected foreign markets, as a function to the degree of potential image of 
economic pressure, which thereby defines the strength of these. However, because of the geographical 
limitations which surrogate boycotts often has and the before mentioned market share shift, the economic 
pressure should more be seen as the relative market share in the affected market and the overall image 
pressure which it may cause.  
 
A second factor is in this study identified as the potential sacrifice which the corporation has to make in 
order to face the boycott in the most optimal way. The sacrifice is related to those actions a corporation takes 
in order to influence the policy that has led to the boycott and thereby change the course of this. The sacrifice 
should be seen as not only the cost of influencing the policy makers’ e.g. by lobbing and PR. But more over 
and perhaps more importantly the economic and image costs which the corporation, primarily in its domestic 
and related markets, will face both in the short and long run by standing up to these policies. The importance 
of these factors and thereby the associated “cost” is dependent of the degree of commitment to these policies 
of both policy makers and stakeholders. Such sacrifice is closely connected to the corporate brand identity 
and brand image. The connection to the policies which have led to the boycott is by definition indirect. But 
as soon as the corporation will act in relation to this, its connection will establish more directly. But many 
times there is a snag in this, as some stakeholders, expects the corporation to take a stand in such situation. 
This is due to the characteristics of brands, which increasingly are based on desires and emotional aspirations 
rather than needs. This is so because consumers increasingly find them in a position with interest to influence 
the brand. Surrogate boycotts are by definition reactive, as the brand image already is being influenced by 
various stakeholders, and the corporation has to relate to such development. But this does not mean that the 
corporation should purely focus on the image. Rather the corporation has to relate to its brand identity. This 
will secure that the intended reactions to the surrogate boycott, actually can be carried out in practice, and 
hence develop into a conscious brand building process. It is therefore central that the brand only adapt to 
changes in a way that stays true to itself. Therefore the corporation has to consider the degree of freedom for 
brand change which exists. There is little sense in undertaking initiatives, which cannot be absorbed by the 
brand. This is perhaps one of the biggest challenges and pitfalls within surrogate boycotts. As such boycott 
hits rather unexpected innocent victim, managers will often be tempted to take short-termed opportunistic 
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actions, as they see them in their best right to do so. This is however not the case, as the actions under a 
surrogate boycott still has to be put in relation to the brand identity and the long term development.          
 
The model is based on the two axes “Pressure” of the agent and “Sacrifice” which the organisation has to do 
in order to influence the policy maker.  
 
Figure  10 Strategic options for surrogate boycott targets (own construction) 
One possible scenario would be if the boycotter’s pressure is relatively high while the organisation’s 
sacrifice in order to influence the policy maker is low. In such LobbyOver situation, an appropriate approach 
is then to very actively argue for the sake of the boycotter to obtain a policy change to cease the boycott. 
Such an act by the corporation is for example to excurse lobbyism and publicly in the media establishes 
statements of that kind that are clearly taking an active stand for the sake of the boycotter. This clearly 
implies making use of arguments in order to convince the policy maker to change. As their commitment to 
their policy is expected to be rather low, this is not an unlikely option to follow. However, the corporation is 
in need of sound arguments as it is policies they are about to change after all. In such situation it is most 
likely that the policy makers and the other different stakeholder supporting them possesses legitimacy alone 
but do not have power nor urgency. Hence the argumentation should be aimed at creating rhetoric 
establishing moral authority. Here central elements to use in the argumentation are fairness, responsibility 
and commitment. (Sillence 2002) However this should be done without neglecting the brand identity, which 
also is the case in the three other options. Here Coombs communication strategy called “endorsement of 
external expert” might prove very useful. Experts and professionals within the issue which has let to the 
boycott, can be good proponents to influence the given policy. This will not only address the policy in itself, 
it will also show a commitment to the agents who are leading the boycott. Thereby it will be able to both 
change the policy and/or ease the boycott itself through the stronger association to the agents which will be 
established.     
 
In situations with both low pressure and low sacrifice, the boycott situation is not very threatening and can be 
considered a WalkOver. However the corporation has a clear opportunity to regain its market acceptance in 
the affected market by influencing the policy maker. Since the pressure is relatively low the amount of 
resources to use in order to change the policy should of course be taken into consideration. Basically the 
situation is the same in the above-mentioned lobby over, although the pressure is low. This means that the 
corporation should take similar actions but in doing so, the economic aspect of influencing is of key 
importance. Therefore the argumentations should normally be restricted to making public argumentation 
statements.  
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A severe and complex exist when both pressure and sacrifice is high. Such TurnOver situation is a very 
delicate matter for the organisation and puts it in a hard dilemma, as both sides will argue strongly for their 
positions. Since the cost of influencing the policy maker will be high, it is recommendable for the 
corporation to peruse the cause of the boycotter since their pressure is of great importance to the companies’ 
survival. This only leaves the corporation the option to actively take the side of the boycotter in order to 
regain acceptance in their main market. The way to do this is to differentiate from its association and signal a 
clear and long term commitment to the boycotters. This will naturally have effect on the market related to the 
policy, although that market is of less importance to the organisation. Therefore the only option for the 
corporation, although difficult, is to change side to its most important stakeholder. This will clearly have an 
effect on the markets supporting the policy, however the costs which this might bring must be accepted in 
order to rescue its main market. The task of convincing boycotters is so to speak not an easy one, and as the 
boycotters can be expected to have legitimacy, power and urgency, the corporation need to act fast and 
convincingly. The way to do this is to play on and use the self interest of the boycotters in the argumentation. 
By illustrating reciprocity, consensus, consequences, promises in its argumentation the corporation is likely 
to convince the boycotters of benefits of all, and thereby also at the same time distance taking from the 
policy markers. (Sillince 2002) The integration and mortification strategies illustrated by Coombs are tools 
which can be used to differentiate from the policy association and establish relationships to the agents. Ways 
to get such public approval might be to refer to the corporate image and thereby find arguments which 
illustrate the corporation’s natural distance from the policy and thereby get approval among agents and turn 
the boycott. More concrete is the mortification strategy which aims at establishing forgiveness. This is not 
directly applicable to a surrogate boycott, as the corporation here per definition has nothing to forgive. 
Nevertheless the same concrete approach might be taken. Here Coombs argues for the use of compensation 
as a way to obtain forgiveness and hereby illustrate that a similar situation will not happen again. Although 
we can not speak of compensation it its strict sense, the corporation is however able to show strong 
commitment to the agents. This can be done by offering concrete professional and economical backing for 
the agent’s course.       
 
The final situation, BlowOver occurs when the sacrifice is high and the pressure is low. This is in many times 
a matter of time before the situation will change to the better, and in any case it doesn’t reflect a very critical 
situation for the corporation. This combined with the high sacrifice in order to influence the policy makers it 
is recommended not to do anything, especially not going against the policy makers, as it normally only will 
put the corporation in a even worse situation. What can be done in order to optimize the situation, is to use 
the fact of their innocence in this situation and argue for the impact this has for the corporation. Such 
statements will in itself not lead to any escalation of the boycott, but will have the likelihood of gaining more 
support in the policy affected markets. (Friedman 1996) What Coombs refers to as a suffering strategy can 
here be very usable. By portraying the corporation as a victim, it can be possible to reduce the effect of the 
boycott. Such strategy can be carried out both on a domestic and foreign level. As the domestic commitment 
to the policy can be expected to be very high, the public will also be expected to defend such policy very 
intense. This can lead to strong sympathy for companies which are suffering under this policy. Therefore the 
corporation can be expected to gain sympathy effects by, illustrating how they are being affected by the 
boycott. On a foreign basis, the corporation can address primarily the market segments which have little or 
strong positive opinions for the policy. By illustrating their innocent role in this conflict, this can to some 
degree be expected to lead to sympathy effects. The more active opponents of the policy cannot be expected 
to change their mind of the boycott, however this action will as long as it just points to companies suffering, 
not change their present and future opinion. This is so because they do not have any negative relationship to 
the corporation as such, but only initiate the boycott with ends-justifying-means rationales to influence a 
policy.  
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The proactive dimension of surrogate boycotts is addressing how corporations can minimise the risk of 
damaging stakeholder actions. CSR and stakeholder theory will be discussed as basic concepts which are 
useful as proactive tools to take care of important stakeholders. Moreover, the dimension of the global 
business environment will be added to the discussion as this is a variable which can not be neglected in a 
brand context.  
 
What a corporation can do to prevent a crisis is of course very situational specific. This is demonstrated by 
the four different types of crises, which corporations may face. The crisis literature claimed that not all 
crisis’s can be prepared and prevented. Especially the external-abnormal issues are often unpredictable in 
respect to timing and magnitude. On the basis of that statement, it is clear that situations as for example a 
surrogate boycotts can not be totally prevented, as they are abnormal circumstances which are hard to predict 
and furthermore, out of direct corporate control. A corporation faced with a threat of becoming a victim of a 
surrogate boycott, might have an option to work as a diplomat between the conflicting parties, but this may 
not be without significant consequences. The situation is becoming increasingly complicated and sensitive 
when the dispute is concerning missing overlaps, in regard to hypernorms, between the external parties. The 
reason for this is because of the risk of offending any stakeholders on the respective sides, as they both can 
be highly committed to stand for what they believe is right.  
 
Figure  11 Crisis categorization (own construction) 
The general literature regarding corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory is suggesting that 
crises can be predicted and solved before it even can become a critical situation such as a boycott. 
Nevertheless, as presented above this is not always possible and depends on the nature of the situation. 
However, it should by far not to be neglected, that concepts such as corporate social responsibility and 
stakeholder theory are very important. Why corporations in most cases can be expected to benefit from their 
social responsible values and strong stakeholder orientation.  
It was previously discussed how important it is for brands to connect with its stakeholders, and by 
implementing corporate social responsibility into the corporate identity, it will help corporations to make this 
connection, and thereby minimize the risk of any external problems. If a corporation is really respected and 
stands for something unique, which most of their stakeholders admire, the probability of stakeholder threat 
will become less, and further the corporate image will be better prepared to withstand a potential attack. The 
idea behind corporate social responsibility is to be in constant dialogue with the respective stakeholders, and 
thereby create a picture of what they expect. In that respect, even when corporations are facing an external-
abnormal crisis situation, initiatives such as social responsibility can be beneficial, not as it can prevent a 
Predictability  
Ability to prevent 
External-abnormal 
 
Internal-abnormal 
 
External-normal 
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crisis, but rather that it thereby can minimize the image damage. In other words, a strong brand will not 
suffer to the same extent as a weaker brand, but then again it depends on the specific circumstances. 
 
As introduced, corporate social responsibilities can not solve everything regarding the external stakeholders. 
Stakeholders are all different and they all have individual expectations which they value. The stakeholder 
environment is becoming increasingly fragmented due to social developments, cultural clashes and 
internationalization. This means that one social responsible initiative aimed at satisfying certain stakeholders, 
might conflict with other stakeholders and thereby also have a negative impact on the corporate image. This 
leads into the discussion about corporate identity and diversity. Especially when confronted with a crisis, 
which put pressure on a corporation in terms of either or both economically and image-wise, it would be 
preferable for corporations to just change directions and adapt to the expected demands of certain dissatisfied 
stakeholders. However, as pointed out, this is not likely to be as easy as it seems. The identity of a brand has 
to stay somewhat consistent over time, which makes it hard for corporations to adapt to all stakeholders 
demands, if they want to protect their brand value. Hence, the identity of a corporation is setting the standard 
of what can be changed. Moreover, there is a paradox in the fact that people are becoming more demanding 
regarding brands, and therefore pressures corporations to create more specific identities. Hereby corporations 
target markets are simultaneously becoming increasingly fragmented.  Some elements of a corporate identity, 
such as country of origin, the history or the founder etc., might even be impossible to change. If these 
elements of a corporate identify is the core of a dispute, it puts the corporation in a very unfortunate position. 
 
This dilemma of fragmentation and globalization corporations are facing today is very sensitive, and it is not 
possible to come up with one single answer on how to solve this, as every business is different. However, we 
find that a tendency in today’s business is the need for authenticity and strong brands which connects 
emotionally with the stakeholders of a corporation. A way to do this is for corporations to have strong 
identities which they intuitively act according to. This means that a corporation should actively and self 
motivated express their opinions about various issues, which will strengthen its identity and thereby its 
image. By doing so, stakeholders will perceive the corporation as having a true identity with own opinions 
and being authentic. 
 
Consumers buy brands which they can relate to and want to be associated with. Hence, corporations should 
identify its primary stakeholder targets and adapt their identity to fit with the specific stakeholder values and 
norms. This will motivate an emotional connection, as the primary stakeholders find the corporation to stand 
for what they believe in. If a corporation succeeds in making this emotional connection, it will additionally 
be better prepared for a boycott, as they have strong supporters which are sharing their identity. 
 
The legitimacy of critical stakeholders is to be considered as well. If the stakeholder’s legitimacy who is 
threatening a corporation is high, it puts increased pressure on the corporation to adapt to their demands. 
Corporations have to evaluate who are the most important stakeholders to be considered and listen to, and in 
a worst case scenario a corporation might even be forced to take a side, if conflicting stakeholder 
expectations are present. Taking sides in a conflict could in the right circumstances boost the image of a 
corporation in the eyes of stakeholders, as it officially takes a stand which is inline with the stakeholders own 
norms and values, and thereby directly makes an emotional connection. For this move to be as efficient as 
possible it has to be self motivated and further by being the first mover it might have an even better impact 
on their perceived brand. The reason for this is that it can be related to the theory of corporate crisis’s, where 
it is argued, that how a corporation acts in a pressured situation will determine its character and thereby 
strengthen its image.  
 
Globalization was argued to be a problem for brands in respect to the issue of identity vs. diversity. Hence, 
the following will address the concepts of brands in a global perspective. The challenge for brand managers 
facing the global market is to adapt to the local market without undermining the fundamental values of the 
brand identity. This is related to the previous discussion concerning the fragmented stakeholder environment. 
What a brand manager could do is to consider to what extent some of their basic values should be reflected 
in their brand in certain markets. For example, if the origin of the corporations happens to be an obstacle, the 
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corporation might consider try keeping it hidden. However, it should be stressed, that whatever a corporation 
does, it will never be able to hide all traces of its origin. Additionally, it should be mentioned that national 
identities are quite significant in international markets. It can give the consumer the impression of quality 
and increased status as global brands are perceived as being big and strong. A variable which should be 
considered by corporations is their strategic position in respect to its customers. If the corporation is highly 
differentiated and consumers are depended on the products they offer, then the risk for a boycott or other 
corporate threat initiated by customers would be minimal. However, if the corporation is in a market with 
low differentiation and high competition costumers will find it easier to find a substitute and thereby put 
pressure on a corporation which goes against their values and norms. 
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5 “Sour Milk” - Arla Foods in the Muhammad crisis 
If the milk turns out to be sour, I ain't the kinda pussy to drink it. 
-Rory Breaker, Lock Stock and Two Smoking Barrels 
 
 
! .1
Arla Foods (Arla) was established in 2000 by the merger of the Danish dairy company MD Foods and the 
Swedish dairy company Arla. Arla produces and distributes milk based products. The organisation is owned 
by approximately 10.600 co-operative milk producers in Denmark and Sweden, and is today the second 
largest dairy organisation in Europe. The largest market is Great Britain which accounts for 33 per cent of 
the total turn over. The second largest market is Sweden where the market represents 22 per cent of the turn 
over, followed by Denmark with 19 per cent. (Arla 2006a) Arla is further exporting to other markets in 
Europe, North America, Middle East and China. (See appendix 2).  
 
Arla's vision is to become Europe’s leading dairy organisation. The goal is to pay the highest possible price 
to the co-operatives for their milk, and this shall be done by becoming the leading organisation in Europe and 
thereby improve their bargaining position towards other primary stakeholders. Aside from focusing on the 
welfare of the co-operatives, it is Arla’s intention to satisfy the needs of the consumers by offering inspiring, 
secure and healthy dairy products.  
Arla is conscious about the fact, that if they intend to pay the highest price to the co-operatives and become 
market leader in Europe, they have to put the consumer in focus. Arla’s mission statement is: “… to provide 
modern consumers with milk-based products that create inspiration, confidence and well-being.” (Arla 
2006b)   
 
Arla intent to create security and wellbeing, which should be done by offering tasty and healthy products. 
The consumers have to be convinced that Arla through out the whole value chain are concerned with the use 
of resources, environment, wellbeing of animals and ethics. This is an important part of the image 
communication and how Arla would like to be perceived by the consumers. (Arla 2006b) 
 
! 		)
	
Arla is increasingly facing competition on the main markets. As a way to improve Arla’s competitive 
position and protect them from the discount competitors, Arla wants to improve their brands. Especially, 
they intent to strengthen their global corporate brand, which requires heavy marketing investments in certain 
selected markets. (Arla 2006c) As part of this brand vision they want “To become the world leader in value-
creation within the dairy sector.” In doing so, this among others involves becoming: 
• Northern Europe’s preferred dairy group among consumers, customers and milk producers  
• Northern Europe’s market leader within all types of dairy products with a broad range, strong brands 
and a high degree of consumer confidence  
Finally as part of this vision, Arla want to build a stronger corporate brand in Western Europe. This brand 
building should be based on an internationalization of Arla’s Scandinavian values. They state that in Western 
Europe, outside Denmark, Sweden and UK, the Arla brand does not have any such meaning. (Arla 2006d, 
Arla 2006e) 
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Further strategic initiatives are made to expand outside the main markets, due to the saturated market 
conditions (Børsen 2005a). These markets are primarily Northern America, Eastern Europe, Russia and the 
Middle East. In particular investments to expand and grow are made in the Middle East (Arla 2006c).  
 
An additional motive for Arla to expand in foreign markets is due to their poor image in primarily the Danish 
market where they are accused of using their dominating position on the market. Arla are therefore 
announcing that they intend to grow primarily outside their home markets (Børsen 2005b).  
 
Arla’s image has the last few years suffered substantially and two third of the Danish consumers are stated to 
have a negative perceived image of Arla (Modig 2005). Therefore one of the main contemporary initiatives 
for Arla is to improve its image in Denmark rather than increasing market shares (Arla 2006c). The rapport 
“our responsibility” is clear attempt of this. It among other states that: “We shall have efficient procedures 
for handling complaints from consumers and customers with the aim of resolving disputes within a 
reasonable period of time and in a reliable manner.” and ”We shall provide our customers with adequate 
and relevant information about our company, our products and our production processes.” 
Arla goes further than that and stte that they shall maintain good, respectfull and constructive sommunity 
relations. They among other want to do this by creating ”...permanent relations with the local community, 
based on respect, responsibility, dialogue and realistic expectations.” (Arla 2005) 
 shall maintain good, respectful and constructive community relations. 
The bad image of Arla among the Danish consumers, have developed into a situation where consumers 
increasingly are preferring products from competing dairies as an act of dissatisfaction (Børsen 2005c). In 
order to create a more positive image, as Arla e.g. is experiencing in Sweden, they want to listen more to the 
consumers and thereby try to position them selves less dominant (Børsen 2004).  
  
! *	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30th September 2005 Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten posts 12 satirical drawings of the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad. This was part of a Danish debate, based on writer Kåre Bluitgen’s difficulties in finding 
illustrators to a book on the prophet Muhammad’s life. In fear of violence several illustrators refused to 
contribute to Bluitgen’s book. This led Jyllands-Posten to print 12 satirical drawings of the prophet, with 
their proclamation to maintain the freedom of speech. This resulted in a critical conflict, where Islamic 
countries and groups protested against the depiction of their prophet, which according to Islamic beliefs is 
prohibited. The satirical perspective in these drawings naturally intensified such critique. This culminated in 
a situation, where fundamental norms and values collided between the issues of religion and freedom of 
speech respectively. This led to intense debates, demonstrations and even boycotts, bringing “innocent 
victims” such as companies into the crisis. (DR 2005a)   
 
! 	
Based on the Muhammad drawings, Danish Islamic organisation “Islamiske Trossamfund” and 12 other 
Danish Islamic organisations in October 2005 in a statement demanded Jyllands-Posten to withdraw the 
drawings and further give an official apology to all Muslims. The statement contained three central 
proclamations, which “…condemned the provoking and arrogant act, which created bitterness and ethnic 
insults among Muslims in Denmark and the rest of the world” It stressed that “…the newspaper with this 
action, consciously had trampled on the ethnic and moral values of Islam, with the purpose to flatten and 
ridicule Muslims feelings, shrines and religious symbols.”, and stated that “Muslims cannot account for the 
fact that the limit of freedom of speech suddenly stops at critique of Semitism or Dannebrog [Danish flag]. 
This is perceived as hypocrisy.” (Det Islamiske Trossamfund 2005) 
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However from a legal perspective, the drawings were not violating any Danish criminal law, why no official 
attempts to meet the requirements of the Danish Islamic organisations were made by Jyllands-Posten (DR 
2005a). After increasing debates, demonstrations and even threats to the “Muhammad drawers” life, the 
Danish Prime Minister in October actively chooses to enter the debate, by stressing that: “We live in a free 
democracy, where an extensive freedom of speech exists, and this freedom of speech also includes the 
opportunity to stand critically towards religion.” (DR 2005a)   
 
In a reaction to little Danish attempts to respond to the critique of the Muhammad drawing, 11 Islamic 
countries with embassies and representation in Denmark, in a protest declaration, request a meeting with 
Danish Prime Minister to get his response and distance taking from the Muhammad drawings and what they 
call an “on-going smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam and Muslims.” 
(Buch 2005) As a respond to this, and with reference to the fact that “The freedom of speech is the very 
foundation of the Danish society…and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press.”, the 
Prime Minister refuses such meeting in a written statement. (DR 2005b) This decline motivates a delegation 
of Danish Muslims, primarily imams from “Islamisk Trossamfund” to travel to the Middle East in order to 
bring attention to the drawings and discuss this matter with leading officials and religious leaders (DR 2005a, 
Wikipedia 2006b). Central for this is a 43 page dossier which they bring in order to influence political and 
religious leaders (Wikipedia 2006c).  
 
The Islamic Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO) which is part of “The Organisation 
of The Islamic Conference” (OIC) on December 27th threaten to encourage its 51 member-countries to break 
off all economic and political relations, unless Denmark issues an official apology for “the drawings which 
has insulted the worlds Muslims.” (Politiken 2005)   
 
In January it seemed that the crisis was flagging, when Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller and general 
secretary from The Arab League Amr Moussa agreed that the drawings no longer should be a sticking point 
between Denmark and the Arab countries. (Politiken 2006a) Nevertheless the crisis takes a critical turn when 
citizens in Saudi Arabia from 20th of January and onwards are encouraged to boycott all Danish products. 
These encouragements are spreading via emails and SMS-messages throughout the country (Information 
2006). The crisis at this time no longer exists on strictly political level, but flourishes among all spheres of 
society in both Middle East and the western world, and the consumer boycott starts to take form throughout 
Saudi Arabia, and soon spreads to Kuwait and other countries around the Middle East. Signs are placed in 
supermarkets encouraging consumers to avoid Danish products and Danish products are even removed from 
the shelves. (Aljazeera 2006) At the same time religious and political leaders in Saudi Arabia are 
encouraging to boycott all Danish products. On January 27th the Friday prayer is used by several imams 
throughout the Middle East, to encourage to a boycott of all Danish products. (DR 2006a)  
 
At this time the boycott, starts to have a clear impact on Danish companies operating in the Middle East, 
especially after the largest Supermarket chain in Saudi Arabia threatens to bypass Danish products entirely 
unless an official Danish apology is given. (DR 2006b, DR 2006c)  
 
Due to the increased pressure on Denmark and Danish interest, Jyllands-Posten’s editor-in-chief reacts and 
tries to explain the purpose of the drawing, stressing that no intentions to insult other people were part of this 
(Politiken 2006b). He deplores unintended to have insulted Muslims. However on the grounds of freedom of 
speech, he refuses to deplore the fact of bringing the drawings. “…They were not intended to be offensive, 
nor were they at variance with Danish law, but they have indisputably offended many Muslims for which we 
apologize… That this happened was, consequently, unintentional.” (Jyllands-Posten 2006) A number of 
Danish Islamic organisations are not satisfied with the apology from Jyllands-Posten. On a press conference 
held at Islamisk Trossamfund”, spokesman for the 27 organisations Ahmed Akkari states that: “We miss a 
clear statement, where the newspaper apologize the insult. That they stick to it and not subsequently give an 
ambiguous statement.” (DR 2006d) 
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As a response to this development, the Danish Prime Minister states that he personally takes distance from 
the drawings, and stresses that the government can not, nor will apologize. “Personally I have such a respect 
for people’s religious belief, so I myself never would depict Muhammad, Jesus or other religious figures in a 
way, which can insult other people.” But emphasises that: “…freedom of speech is inviolable. It is 
meaningless, that wee give an apology.” (Politiken 2006c) 
Nevertheless the crisis only seems to intensify, leading to increasing boycott of Danish products and political 
attention throughout the Middle East. Syria publicly states their shock of the drawings, which is considered 
“a great insult…which is denounced strongly.” (DR 2006e)  More critical is the governmental actions of 
Bahrain and Egypt, which both actively call for boycott of all Danish products (TV2 2006a, DR 2006f). 
Early February, boycott of Danish goods is initiated by Omani retail chains, and Islamic retailer Ziyad 
Brothers suspends business with Arla. The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, orders to cancel all 
economic contracts with countries where the media have published the drawings. (Politiken 2006d) During 
February the crisis develops as several newspapers around the world reprints the cartoons, which led to 
increasing demonstrations (DR 2006a, Wikipedia 2006b).  
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen appears on the Arabic TV-station Al Arabiya, where he 
explains, to the 50 million viewers, that "...the Danish government condemns every expression and action, 
which insults people religious feelings.”(DR 2006g) Despite the belief that such appearance on TV would 
have calmed the situation, the Friday prayer on February 3rd is used around the Islamic world to condemn 
Denmark. This leads to stronger demonstrations in the Middle East, where Danish flags, embassies and 
dummies of Danish politicians are set on fire (DR 2006a).      
The crisis from Denmark’s point of view and the associated boycott is on the other hand not one sided. 
Buycott campaigns thus are initiated in especially the United States and Germany which is supporting 
Danish companies. Many western minded consumers are taking distance from the boycott and the aggressive 
reactions in the Middle East. They express this by consciously buying Danish products, and this could 
compensate fore the economical loses Danish companies are facing, and eventually maybe even benefit the 
Danish economy. (Børsen 2006) 
 
! 2
The debate and crisis has not only worked on an official and political level. As illustrated earlier the Middle 
East population has taken a very active position in the crisis. However the people in western world have also 
been absorbed by the crisis. In general the population in the western world thought it was a bad idea to bring 
the drawings in the first place. They however at the same time accept and support the right to bring the 
drawings, as this is a part of the freedom of speech. (See appendix 3)  
The Danish public is divided up into equally large groups when it comes to the justification for bringing the 
drawings in the first place. However they still agree on several points. First of all a clear majority supports 
the principles of freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. Additionally a majority find that neither the 
Danish government nor Jyllands-Posten should apologise. The Danes are especially agreeing with the Danish 
government, and their unwillingness to apologies for the incidence. (See appendix 3-4) 
The Danish people think that leading Danish Muslims carries the main responsibility for the crisis, as 58 per 
cent pointed at the Danish Imams as them with the primary responsibility, whereas 22 percent said that 
Jyllands-Posten was responsible, only 5 per cent said that the government was responsible and finally said 11 
percent that it was the Middle Eastern governments who were responsible. (See appendix 3)    
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Arla was about the first Danish companies to feel the Arabic boycott, when initiated in February 2006. The 
boycott began in Saudi Arabia and soon spread to the entire Middle East. In Saudi Arabia – Arla’s main 
market in the Middle East – consumers were urged by media and religious leaders to boycott Danish 
products and as part of this, pictures of Arla’s products were shown and their name mentioned. This was 
supported by circulating emails and SMS-messages listing all Danish products sold in the Middle East.  
Distributors and specific supermarkets took a very active role in the boycott. By either completely removing 
all Arla’s products from the shelves or distinctively marking them as “Danish products” they avoided 
consumers from buying Arla products or helped them to make an active choice. Additionally many 
customers simply refused to do business with Arla and cancelled all orders, with reference to the drawings. 
(Arla 2006f)  
 
The boycott led Arla to make a press release available in the local language on all it markets, where 
Executive Director Finn Hansen stated that Arla for many years “…has traded, and enjoyed good relations 
with consumers in the Middle East. In fact, we have more Muslim than Danish consumers. We respect all 
religions and wish to express our sympathy and understanding of those who feel wringed by this incident. 
Obviously, Arla Foods does not support anything that offends people’s religion or ethnic background”.  He 
further added that it was up to the parties involved to find a solution through dialogue. (Arla 2006f) 
 
Soon after, Arla decided to insert large ads in Saudi Arabia’s leading newspapers. As a press release by the 
Danish ambassador in Saudi Arabia, was not cited in local medias, Arla decided to pay for its publishing. 
The ad was a straight reprint of the ambassador’s statement, without any additional comments. The ad 
however made it clear that Arla had paid for its insertion. Arla’s purpose was according to Finn Hansen to 
avoid further escalations of the boycott. He however added that Arla did not have particularly high 
expectations for the ad to succeed this purpose, as he saw a dialogue between the involved parties, as the 
only thing which could bring an end to the boycott. (Arla 2006g) (See appendix 5)  
 
As the boycott increased and spread throughout the Middle East, Arla soon faced the harsh consequences. In 
late January all customers in the region had cancelled all their orders with Arla, their products had been 
removed from many stores and sales had almost stopped completely in most of the countries. (Arla 2006h)  
 
Arla followed the crisis intensely and via press releases commented on the situation regularly.  
 
After Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s statement on January 31st, Arla’s Managing 
Director, Peder Tuborgh commented that he was very satisfied with this and saw a platform for a dialogue. 
He stated that Arla were “…waiting to see how the parties involved can resolve the situation.” Arla 
recognized their role in such process and Peder Tuborgh declared they would “…make all resources 
available in order to create a dialogue which can contribute to resolving…the… destructive conflict.” He 
would however not comment on the background for the drawings and the rightfulness in bringing them. 
(Arla 2006i) 
 
"Arla is neither a newspaper nor a political party, and we don’t wish to take part in a political debate. 
Equally, we’re not responsible for solving the conflict, but we would like to contribute to a dialogue between 
the parties and urge them to find a solution.” (Arla 2006i) With reference to this and the Danish freedom of 
speech Peder Tuborgh stated that: ”In Denmark we have two core values: one is that you cannot offend other 
people because of, for instance, their religion or ethnic origin. The other is free speech. I believe that both 
businesses and people have a responsibility for ensuring a balance between these two values. The one should 
not exclude the other.” (Arla 2006i) 
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Despite the boycott in Arabic world, Arla decided to be present on the largest food exhibition in the Middle 
East – Gulf Food - which began February 19. Regional Director Jan E. Pedersen said that this exhibition 
“…will give us the opportunity to explain the situation calmly.” Where Arla normally has used this 
exhibition to launch new products, although also doing so this time, the main motive was to work on the 
boycott. Thus during the exhibition, signs at the stand took distance from the drawings, copies of Jyllands-
Posten’s apology was handed out and staff was present to meet with the media. Nevertheless Arla did not 
have high expectation for these initiatives to solve or have an impact on the boycott, as Jan E. Pedersen 
explained: ”We don’t expect our participation in the exhibition to have an impact on the boycott, which is 
the consumers’ choice. But we will have some valuable discussions with our business contacts.” (Arla 2006j) 
 
The Danish population has expressed sympathy for Arla’s innocent role in the crisis, and around 50 percent 
in a poll said that they would support Arla and be conscious about buying more of Arla’s products 
(Berlingske 2006a). Arla could thus also report that they had received more support among its Danish 
stakeholders due to the crisis. In the middle of February 2006 Arla had thus experienced sales progress on 
their Danish market with more than 15 percent. More importantly Arla could for the first time in several 
years note a marked improvement on its Danish popularity-barometer. (Berlingske 2006d)   
 
Running at full scale, the boycott caused Arla a daily loss of DKK 10 million from its Middle East 
operations (TV2 2006b). Primo march Arla took stock on the boycott and estimated the annual cost to DKK 
400 millions. This as an estimation however assumed that products would return to Middle East stores 
relatively soon, and that Arla before the end of 2006 would have reached 50% of its pre-boycott sales in the 
Middle East. Despite this Arla looks bright on the future in this region. ”Despite the difficult situation, we 
believe that Arla has a future in the Middle East… Over 40 years, we have worked hard to build our brands 
in the Middle East in order to provide our co-operative members with a stable income. As a result, we have 
an intimate knowledge of the market and we will not give up easily.”  Peder Tuborgh (Arla 2006k). 
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6 Analysis 
He never spoke to me when he came in to the room; he passed me in the fields as if he did not see me; 
indeed he had always that manner to me – he did not see me – I did not exist for him. I was well 
content that this should be; but, after I had been there a short time, Mr. Brand began to make 
distinet mischief between us. 
-Charles Dickens, The Family at Fenhouse 
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As Arla is exposed to a surrogate boycott, one has to take a different perspective to evaluate how this has 
influenced its corporate brand, as compared to a traditional boycott. The reason for this is that victims of a 
surrogate boycott are not threatened due to direct actions, but rather because of their association with the 
boycotter’s primary target. In the case of the Muhammad crisis, Arla is boycotted due to their association to 
Denmark, as the primary target is Jyllands-Posten and the Danish Government. Hence, Arla’s’ corporate 
brand is threatened as the perceived image of their country of origin is suffering damage. In other words, as 
Denmark is part of Arla’s corporate identity, Muslim consumers will associate Arla with Danish values, 
which are at the core of the dispute.  
 
Figure  12 The boycott of Arla Foods in the Middle East (Own Construction) 
The magnitude of the boycott and how it affects the corporate image of Arla, can be evaluated in the light of 
legitimacy, urgency and power of the involved stakeholders. As the dispute is concerning conflicting 
hypernorms, involving the Islamic norms and values, and the Danish values of freedom of speech, the 
legitimacy is very high on both sides. Moreover, the Middle East accounts for five percent of Arla’s total 
turnover, which viewed isolated gives the Middle Eastern stakeholders a position of high power. Finally, as 
Arla are facing significant instant economical losses, urgency is also very high. Hence, the magnitude of the 
crisis is relatively large, and Arla can expect their corporate image to suffer significantly, in the eyes of the 
boycotters as long as the dispute continues, and part of their identity can also in the future be expected to 
suffer under a negative country of origin effect. In this way Arla has been influenced both by instant 
economical losses, but also with respect to their image, which has been more closely connected to negative 
associations with Denmark. 
 
However, corporation’s stakeholder environment is very complex, and one has to get the whole picture 
before evaluating how this crisis has influenced Arla’s corporate image. The core of the conflict is concerned 
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with deep fundamental values for both of the conflicting parties, why it is appropriate to include how Arla’s 
corporate image has been affected by its stakeholders outside the Middle East. This especially relates to the 
Danish market, which not only is one of their main markets but also where the conflict has been followed 
most intensely. Even if Danes express their understanding for Muslims feeling degraded by the drawings of 
Muhammad, they at the same time have strong opinions about the crisis, as freedom of speech is a precious 
element located deep in their fundamental values and norms. The general Danish opinion is supported by the 
Danish prime minister, which is not willing to make a public apology, as that would be to apologies for who 
they are and their values. The Danish people overall thinks that the Danish government has handled the crisis 
very well. Moreover, half of the Danish people have in a poll expressed their intention to support Arla in 
their daily shopping. This can be interpreted as an attempt to support Arla who is boycotted due to the 
Danish values. Danish consumers want to help suffering Danish corporations as they have sympathy with 
them, as they share the same values. Much of this has happened due to word-of-mouth. Especially the 
buycott campaigns in the western world have worked on such level, through blogs, emails SMS-messages 
and statements from various opinion leaders etc. Naturally this has also been the case in the Middle East 
which however has had a more organized approach to their respective boycott campaign. Nevertheless some 
of the same means have been in play here as well. Needless to say, and as will be discussed later on, Arla 
could have done more by actively connecting to the originators of such word-of-mouth. Arla thus also sold 
more in Denmark as a sign of sympathy and further created a somewhat better image among its Danish 
stakeholders.  
 
As a result of this, we believe that Arla’s corporate image was positively influenced by the Muhammad crisis 
in the eyes of the stakeholders who support the Danish values. The sympathy effect from the Danish 
consumers is likely to compensate for the economical losses Arla is suffering in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, as the dispute concerns values and norms, the corporate image of Arla is likely to benefit from 
an emotional connection, which arguably is an even stronger connection to corporations than just awareness. 
Hence, Arla’s corporate image may in the western world be positively affected by the Muhammad crisis and 
may be seen as a corporation which increasingly is associated with Danish values compared with other 
Danish corporations. The Danish stakeholders posses both high power and legitimacy, which increases the 
magnitude of the crisis, and thereby the potential influence on the corporate image. This underlines that, as 
Arla and Danish values are attracting attention from media and various opinion leaders, the sensitivity of 
Arla’s’ image is relatively higher than usual due to the involvement relation the stakeholder will have. This 
is related to the magnitude of the crisis impact which is discussed above, and thereby we can conclude that 
on both sides of the opinion table there will be significant positive and negative impact on Arla’s corporate 
image. 
 
One could look at the crisis from an even wider perspective, than just looking at the primary conflicting 
parties; the Middle East and Denmark. From opinion polls in other western minded countries as France, 
United Kingdom, Norway and the United States it is clear that all support the values of freedom of speech, 
and underlines that this should not be compromised. However, there is moreover a wide understanding and 
opinion that freedom of speech should be used with consideration. Arla have experienced buycott campaigns 
in foreign countries as for example in Germany and the United States, where individuals call for support for 
the westerns right for freedom of speech, by buying Danish products. Denmark has been put on the world 
map due to the conflict, and for some people in the world it will be associated with the little country with 
strong will to protect the western values. Thereby, due to the intense global media interest in the crisis, we 
will argue that Arla and Denmark have increased their awareness but also emotional relation in many 
markets which primarily is positive. 
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The previous question discussed how the corporate brand of Arla was influenced by the Muhammad crisis. 
The conclusion of this was that the boycott both had positive as well as negative affects on the corporate 
image of Arla. However, as this is a very sensitive situation, corporations can not let coincidences control the 
outcomes of such a crisis. The following will discuss what Arla as a global brand should and could have 
done, from when the crisis initiated and until it developed into a boycott.  
 
Surrogate boycotts are often characterized as an escalating conflict. This means that surrogate boycotts from 
a corporate perspective contains a proactive phase, where the conflict is simmering. The proactive dimension 
of boycotts, is addressing how corporations can minimise the risk of damaging stakeholder actions. CSR and 
stakeholder theory are here basic concepts which are useful as proactive tools to take care of important 
stakeholders. A boycott can in general be seen as a consequence of not applying stakeholder theory. This is 
naturally very situation specific and the degree to which proactive actions can be taken, clearly depends on 
the situation. Needless to say, Arla would have been better off, if they were able to connect to the 
stakeholders who let the boycott in a way so they would not have been drawn into this conflict. The general 
literature is suggesting that Arla could have avoided the boycott if they had managed to satisfy their Islamic 
stakeholders in Denmark and in the Middle East. This is however much easier said than done, and would 
have required both good foresight and a very cautious behaviour.  
 
In this conflict, one can identify many different stakeholders which by actions influence other parties and 
thereby also Arla. The most important ones are the general opinions of Denmark, the religious groups in the 
Middle East and Denmark, and finally Arla as the organisation which is trapped in between those two 
struggling parties.  
 
Figure  13 Arla's stakeholders (Own construction) 
One of the most, if not the most important variable to understand why this conflict is difficult to solve, can 
be described by the different parties’ legitimacy according to stakeholder theory. This issue can be explained 
by using the terminology of hypernorms. The whole dispute is essentially a conflict between two 
fundamental differences in the respective stakeholder’s hypernorms, which in this case is about the freedom 
of speech in the western world and how these western norms are conflicting with basic Islamic norms. The 
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legitimacy perspective can be added to underline and explain the barriers for an agreement between Denmark 
and the Middle East. Both parties have a high level of legitimacy supporting their reasons for claiming their 
right because their claims are based on their respective hypernorms. Arla as a Danish corporation is thereby 
in a very difficult position as part of their identity is Danish. Organisational norms should overlap, influence 
and be influenced by stakeholder norms, but in this case it is fundamental conflicting values which is in play. 
According to argumentation theory, whatever “true” claim (based on their hypernorms) either Denmark or 
the Middle East stakeholders would have put forward they would never agree and thereby be influenced by 
the other part.  
 
The question is then, if Arla could have taken proactive actions to avoid the boycott by using stakeholder and 
CSR policies as suggested in the literature? 
 
One of the first issues a corporation has to evaluate is the power of potential boycotters. If the switching cost 
is high and the product is relatively indispensability the corporation has a good bargaining position as their 
consumers are dependent on them. However, in the case of Arla this is not entirely so. Arla is selling grocery 
products on markets with competition, which makes it possible for consumers to shift brand. Therefore, Arla 
is not in a dominating position toward their consumers in the Middle East. In Denmark the situation is 
different, as Arla take up a very dominating position, although there still are other players on the market. The 
situation can thereby be categorised as highly threatening, as Arla can not solve the crisis by demonstrating 
power. 
 
Arla remained rather passive up to the boycott, and did not take any actions towards any of it stakeholders. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that corporations should act responsible towards stakeholders who have an 
effect on the recourses critical for the organisations survival. In the light of this, Arla have not done anything 
that could have offended their stakeholders in the Middle East, beside the fact that they are a Danish 
organisation with a Danish identity. Nevertheless, Arla could have entered the debate while it was 
developing and expressed their sympathy with Islamic values. Then again Arla have to consider the fact that 
an action aiming to satisfy certain stakeholders are likely to have a negative effect on other stakeholders. In 
this case Arla would probably lose a lot of goodwill in their primary markets in the western world. This 
makes it difficult to approach the Middle Eastern stakeholders, without taking distance to their domestic and 
western stakeholders. On the other hand Arla could have commented on the crisis, not in any way taking 
side, which naturally would lead to immediate resentment on either side, but rather in a way calling for 
dialogue. They could actively have joined the debate by encouraging or even arranging meeting between the 
struggling parties. As no parties were satisfied with the situation, this could have helped to a faster softening 
of the conflict. The question then is, whether this is a task for companies?  
 
We would argue that corporations today have to become more involved in issues outside their main 
activities. Consumers and other stakeholders expect more from corporations and they consume what they 
believe is inline with their identity. As this is the case, we call for more personality in corporate identities, 
which can give the consumers more than just the functional benefits, but furthermore, the intangible elements 
connected to a corporation and its products. However, stakeholders and consumers picture of what is ideal 
and right varies depending on individual interests and values. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly 
demanding for corporations to meet the consumers expectations of intangible messages as the corporate 
stakeholder environment is becoming more fragmented.  
 
A crisis is however often a good possibility for a corporation to tell its environment about their mission, 
identity and what they stand for. Crisis literature is drawing parallels between how persons and corporations 
act under pressure and states that this defines character. Moreover, the temporary increased involvement 
from stakeholders is making the perceived image of a corporation more sensitive. Therefore we believe that 
Arla would benefit from standing strong in respect to this crisis, as this would open a window of opportunity 
to improve their image, due to higher involvement and the effect of showing strong character. What we mean 
with taking a strong stand is to enter the debate and express what they think of it. By staying neutral or 
speaking in favour of the Islamic values in the debate, Arla might have the best chances to re-enter the 
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Middle Eastern market successfully. However, as the case has shown, the debate has captured the interest of 
many stakeholders outside the Middle East who has a different perspective. 
 
Arla is a corporation with Scandinavian origin and values, which they in the future plan to make increasingly 
use of, therefore we also think that Arla’s identity should reflect this. Arla’s main markets are Denmark, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, which all can be identified to be western minded. Based on this and the 
Muhammad crisis, which was a question about Islam and western minded values, we believe that Arla 
should have defended the Scandinavian values from their perspective in the debate. This does not mean that 
they should attack the Middle Eastern consumers, but rather make sure that everybody knows where they 
stand. By doing so, Arla would appear true and authentic towards its western minded markets, and it may be 
possible that it could lead to a kind of competitive advantage in these markets, as the consumers feel that 
they connect emotionally with Arla, as they speak in favour of appreciated values. The first mover effect is 
significant in such context, and therefore we recommend Arla to communicate their Scandinavian values and 
thereby become a proponent which reflect the opinion of the stakeholders in their main markets, even if it 
might link them closer to the Danish country of origin, which is increasingly perceived negative in the 
Middle East. It is important for an organisation in a crisis situation, not to lose the support from the 
consumers, and as the Scandinavian markets are among the most important Arla should listen to them. 
 
As Arla tries hard to build up a global brand with strong Scandinavian values, this could have been an 
obvious opportunity to show a global commitment and at the same time underline traditional Scandinavian 
values. This should however not be done too aggressively or acting opportunistically, which could lead to 
critique from both sides. By this we intend to stress that even if Arla are using the crisis to strengthen its 
perceived corporate identity in the eyes of the Danish consumers, we believe that this can be done without 
being aggressive towards the Middle Eastern stakeholders, but rather communicating their identity. This 
however calls for well considered actions, as both parties in the dispute is very sensitive and engaged in the 
debate, as one wrong respond easily can offend either the Danish or Middle Eastern stakeholders. 
 
For Arla to get the most out of the situation, the stakeholder model presented above is very helpful to get the 
bigger picture of the various stakeholders which are likely to influence Arla’s’ image. The model is adapted 
to the situation of Arla in the Muhammad crisis, in order to identify the main stakeholders which Arla should 
consider when evaluating potential responses and other actions. The important opinion leaders have to be 
identified as they are the key for successful crisis response. The main opinion leaders in this crisis are the 
Danish government, Danish Industry, Danish imams, other western minded countries and the Middle Eastern 
political and religious leaders. The Danish government is in this connection an important opinion leader, and 
their actions and opinions are widely accepted among the Danes. We would therefore recommend Arla to act 
in agreement and maybe even in cooperation with the Danish government, and thereby get the support and 
image benefits from the Danish consumers and equilateral.  
Moreover, it can be concluded that there is a wide support for the Danish standpoints outside the Danish 
borders. This is significant for Arla, as they operate in many of these markets, and by dealing with the crisis 
in agreement with these opinions, it might open up for new market potentials, due to the media coverage as 
well as the increased awareness and emotions hereby associated with Arla. 
 
A final comment to this question should be that we do not believe Arla are able to solve the upcoming and 
escalating crisis on their own. Nonetheless, Arla should not just stay neutral, but rather identify the important 
and influential opinion leaders, who act in agreement with the consumers and other important stakeholders. 
The most important point is that Arla do not looses the general consumers support in such process. We 
believe that Arla should stress their Scandinavian origin, and thereby stay consistent with their identity. This 
will help to bring their responsibility into play, and thereby connect emotionally with their customers. As 
stressed earlier emotions are way to create personal dialogue with customers, and this is something Arla has 
been lacking. This may not seem profitable in the short run, but due to the potentially improved image in the 
main markets, we believe that this will be the best choice over the long run. However, it could even prove to 
become an advantage in a short term perspective, as sympathy by the respective stakeholders who support 
the stand point of the western values, are likely to buy more products from Arla, which will compensate for 
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the lost of profits in the Middle East. The problem therefore seem to have been a rather one sighted focus 
from Arla in this crisis. They have more tried to satisfy and engage in dialogue with the conflicting Middle 
Eastern market, than the Danish and other western markets. This not only has been conflicting with their 
values, but it has also neglected those customers in their primary markets. This is essential as customers in 
general, and in this case in specific, want to be heard. This has been one of the major critique-points which 
have been placed upon Arla. The clear interest, and demand for dialogue was clearly illustrated by the 
Danish consumer’s larger consumption of Arla products and their improved perceptions of Arla’s image. 
This was clear signs, which Arla did not act on, and certainly did not use as input in order to reach their 
strategic interest of creating a strong brand.     
 
Such clear and coherent communication becomes even more essential when Arla and other Danish 
companies indirectly are threatened with a boycott. Here it is essential for Arla to communicate their identity 
and stress that even though they are a Danish companies with Danish values, they are not responsible for the 
drawings. This however should be done without neglecting or distance taking from Danish values. Rather 
they should focus on their values and what they have meant for the Middle East market, where they have 
operated for some time, and thereby illustrate that even under such crisis a Danish company with Danish 
values have something to offer the Middle East.   
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When confronted with a surrogate boycott, it is essential to estimate the potential threat the boycott can be 
expected to give based on the economic and image pressure which the stakeholders can impose. Further, the 
cost of changing or influencing the policy which has lead to the boycott becomes a central concern. These 
costs are both related to the image pressure of doing so and the direct cost of taking such actions. Therefore, 
the concrete pressure on Arla has to be related to the different markets where the corporation operates and 
their position towards the political policy bringing the boycott about. Surrogate boycott pressure should be 
seen as potential market changes which can occur. Therefore, companies have to identify their key markets. 
Consequently high boycott pressure only will occur in situations where the boycotting markets has a higher 
market share than the markets which in overall terms support the given policy or if the policy directly 
infringes on the brand image. Adding to this complexity is the degree of commitment for and against the 
given policy. In this way companies will have easier to neglect and act against an opinion which has little 
commitment.  
 
Arla’s key markets is with out doubt related to Denmark, Sweden and the UK. The Middle East “only” 
accounts for five percent of the total sales, and the effect of the boycott is only expected to relate to around 
20 percent of this. As part of Arla’s vision they want “To become the world leader in value-creation within 
the dairy sector.” In doing so, this among others involves becoming: 
• Northern Europe’s preferred dairy group among consumers, customers and milk producers  
• Northern Europe’s market leader within all types of dairy products with a broad range, strong brands 
and a high degree of consumer confidence  
Finally, as part of this vision, Arla want to build a stronger corporate brand in Western Europe. This 
brand building should be based on an internationalization of Arla’s Scandinavian values. They state 
that in Western Europe, outside Denmark, Sweden and UK, the Arla brand does not have any such 
meaning. In other words, Arla primary markets both now and in the near future is expected to be in 
Western Europe. In order to gain strong market presence in these markets, they see their brand infused 
with Scandinavian values as a fundamental part of this.  
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This clearly reflects a situation with a very high sacrifice, if Arla should go on to influence or change the 
Danish policy. This would naturally infringe of the brands potential to become “Scandinavianized”. 
Furthermore, it would very likely be able to create strong resentment from both Danish and also others of its 
Western European stakeholders. Therefore, Arla is in a boycott position, with relatively low 
pressure from the boycotters. As boycotts in general are an extreme situation, the degree of pressure 
will naturally be relative, and even though a substantial pressure might be put on the organisation, 
this has to be seen in relation to the actual options available. Therefore, although the stakeholders in 
the Middle East have legitimacy and urgency they have relatively little power due to the 
characteristic of the surrogate boycott. At the same time Arla has a lot to loose by trying to change 
the policies as this definitely will lead to resentment in the policy related markets. The best way to 
solve a crisis is to modify the perception of the stakeholders who are responsible for the crisis. But 
in this case, such strategy seems rather unlikely as both sides has high legitimacy. Arla situation in 
this surrogate boycott can therefore best be characterized as BlowOver phase. Therefore the only 
possible action is to play on their innocence in this situation.    
 
On behalf on this, and the model introduced, the strategic move Arla should choose in order to minimize 
their image damage in the Middle East and maximize their general financial possibilities in a long term 
perspective, would be to play on their innocence or stay neutral, and thereby do not unnecessarily offend 
either their Middle Eastern nor western stakeholders. It has to be kept in mind that even though the Middle 
Eastern market is important for Arla, the overall turnover “only” accounts for approximately five per cent, 
which underlines the relatively low power of the Middle East over Arla, even if they have high legitimacy. 
Furthermore, if Arla in this conflict choose to adapt to the Middle Eastern norms and values in the debate 
and actively tries to change the policy of the Danish government, it is very likely that their other and primary 
markets outside the Middle East will hurt Arla even harder than the crisis already have. Therefore, the 
sacrifice to influence or change the policy is relatively high. Nevertheless, the Middle Eastern market is even 
if it is characterized as “low pressure”, an important market for Arla, and therefore they can not act with a 
counter strategy.  
 
By choosing to run the advertising campaign, Arla could send unclear signals with regards to their brand 
identity. With statements which indicate understanding and respects for the reactions in the Middle East, 
could infringe unnecessarily on their brand identity as a Scandinavian brand and create distance to their 
stakeholders in their primary markets. We think that Arla, with this advertising statements, goes to far in 
order to satisfy and connect with their Middle Eastern stakeholders, which in this case represents values far 
from their core identity and their stakeholders on the primary markets. This is not only a problem for their 
present situation, but furthermore also in the future, where they expect to be even stronger represented in 
Western Europe, and build a strong brand based on Scandinavian values. Such statements can very easily 
lead to immediate and long term consequences for Arla’s corporate identity. With 79 percent of the Danish 
population, not finding a official apology for the cartoons appropriate, we think that Arla by printing the 
statement will turn head on to their domestic stakeholders. The problem with the statements is that it can be 
interpreted as not only a distance taking from the fundamental western value of freedom of speech, but also 
an understanding for the boycott and the reactions such as threats and direct assaults on Danish property and 
people which has happened under this conflict. On the other hand the statement is likely to be well received 
in the Middle East, but we think that this will be at a too high cost for Arla especially in relation to present 
and future image. This is a very emotional area, and the Danish as well as other western countries has taken 
strong distance from these actions. The statement can therefore send signals which favour the Islamic culture 
over the Danish, and this clearly is a problem in such intense situation, where the Danish population have 
had a relatively homogenous belief about this matter and has shown strong commitment to defend their 
values and stand together as a nation. Therefore, we find that Arla will turn their back towards their Danish 
stakeholder, which can lead to strong resentment in their home market. The statements can thus not only go 
against the majority of its stakeholders, it can also send a statements of inconsistency and populism – where 
Arla is more concerned with a current problem than with staying true to their identity and to those people 
who has helped them to the position where they are today.  
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This is an obvious problem if a brand tries to be more than simply a trademark. In such case emotions 
becomes essential. By printing such statement Arla will be likely to stand out as a corporation more 
interested in immediate profit and weak flickering values. Simply stated Arla with this statement tries to be 
more than what a brand actually can contain. They simply cannot connect with all their stakeholders when it 
comes to such fundamental values and norms. Clearly this will mean neglecting or loosing some 
stakeholders and markets, but on the other hand it can give a better image and more sales in other markets. 
Here the various opinion leaders are an important part of how such communication should happen. In case of 
Denmark, the politicians play a major part of how this crisis has developed. With this statement, Arla goes 
against the Danish government, which will not apologize for the drawings. The government has also called 
for more support from the Danish business community, and due to the governments role as an influential 
opinion leader, this has increased the pressure on Danish companies operating in the Middle East. In other 
words, the Arla brand with this statement is stretched over its limits, and if you try to be everything to 
everybody, you end up being nothing to nobody. This is not to say that Arla should not respond or 
communicate with the Middle Eastern stakeholders. But in doing so they should not infringe on their core 
identity. Rather they should play on their innocence in this case, and illustrate their long-term presence in the 
Middle East. This can happen without going against their corporate identity and the majority of their 
stakeholders.  
 
We suggest that a better strategy would have been to play on their innocent role in this conflict. This is 
especially related to the Danish market, but also other western markets. However by making their values 
clear and providing information about how they have suffered under the crisis, they could have initiated a 
debate which people would be more likely to engage in. We believe, this would have a clear opportunity to 
spread even more intensively through words-of-mouth than the boycott campaigns which have accoutred 
throughout the western world.      
 
Based on this, we would argue that Arla should not conduct the proposed advertising campaign, as it would 
directly infringe on the corporate brand identity and take unnecessary distance from its primary stakeholders.   
The characterized BlowOwer situation does not mean that a company should stay neutral and remain passive, 
but rather use the situation to strengthen or avoid damaging the brand. Other initiative could therefore be 
taken by Arla, as also discussed in the previous section. This could be to engage in, or encourage to dialogue. 
At the same time Arla should use the situation to stress their values, and illustrate how they benefit the 
various markets respectively. Arla decision to publish the press release from the Danish ambassador in Saudi 
Arabia is a good example of this. This clearly illustrates their active role and sincere interest in engaging 
actively in the conflict in order to end it and reach a mutual understanding. We would have recommended 
Arla to stick more inline with such active role in crisis.     
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In today’s society where globalization is becoming more and more significant, we have to accept the fact that 
corporations will face increasingly complex issues. What an organisation did years ago, would maybe 
motivate a reaction by stakeholders closest to them, however, what corporations do today can have 
consequences all over the world. The Muhammad crisis is a perfect example of this, as this global debate 
was initiated by one publication in a newspaper from a relatively small country.  
 
As the complexity of business environments are becoming increasingly complex and sensitive, concepts such 
as corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory is essential to understand. Corporate social 
responsibility and stakeholder theory helps corporations to evaluate their stakeholder environment in order to 
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prevent and solve stakeholder conflicts which may lead to economical and image threats. Nevertheless, crisis 
literature stresses that crises are different and situational specific, why they can not be addressed identically. 
Two fundamental variables are normal and abnormal crises. The abnormal is different as it is more difficult 
to predict and prevent than the normal crisis. Arla’s situation can be categorized as an external-abnormal 
crisis, which makes it very difficult if not impossible to predict and prevent. Surrogate boycotts are an 
abnormal situation as it is outside the hands of the focal corporation and based on unpredictable political 
actions. Therefore, we believe that it is impossible to protect oneself entirely against such situation. Neither 
Arla nor the Danish government can due to western social norms, prohibit persons and the press to express 
themselves, which in this case generated a massive debate. This is therefore something which in the future 
increasingly can be expected to lead to similar situations.  
Figure  14 Arla in the Muhammad crisis (own construction)  
However, this does not mean that corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory is worthless. 
Whereas the abnormal situation which Arla is threatened by is a very seldom issue, the normal crisis 
situations will occur more frequently, and here the concept of social responsibility and stakeholder theory is 
very useful. Therefore, we suggest Arla to use corporate social responsibility as a tool to minimize the 
increased threats from external stakeholder in the global business environment. 
 
Even in a surrogate boycott situation, a corporation may benefit from a strong perceived corporate image, 
which is strengthened by corporate social responsibility. In other words, if Arla manages, by using corporate 
social responsibility, to build up a strong perceived image in the eyes of important stakeholders, Arla as a 
brand would be less threatened and better prepared for a crisis situation. We are aware that Arla’s products 
are in the low involvement category, however, the term of involvement is relative, and we believe that even 
corporations selling low involvement products, can connect emotionally with its customers and other 
stakeholders, especially when it concerns corporate issues and social responsibility. Arla should therefore 
regularly be in dialogue with its environment and thereby get a picture of what is moving and what they 
should do to live up to the external expectations of their stakeholders. Therefore, even when corporations 
such as Arla are facing an external-abnormal crisis situation, initiatives such as social responsibility can be 
beneficial, not as it can prevent a crisis, but rather that it thereby can minimize the image damage. It can 
therefore be expected that stakeholders with a strong emotional connection, will have harder to boycott such 
brand under a surrogate boycott. In other words, a strong brand will not suffer to the same extent as a weaker 
brand, but then again it depends on the specific circumstances.  
 
The business environment we know today is changing, and becoming more democratic. Thereby, 
corporations have to accept that it is not possible to satisfy all stakeholders, as there are many individual 
opinions about what is considered right and wrong. We believe that there is a trend where businesses will 
benefit from creating even stronger and more specific identities than we know today. These identities may 
become similar to ideologies which should be inline with the strategic actions and decisions of the 
Predictability  
Ability to prevent 
Internal-normal 
External-normal 
Internal-abnormal 
External-abnormal 
Arla Foods situation in 
the Muhammad crisis: 
Low predictability and 
little chances to prevent 
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corporation, and corporate social responsibility will be the tool to build up this strong identity. This will 
work out to become a strong competitive advantage as people sharing the same values and norms as the 
corporation, are likely to become strong supporters. However, by communicating direct and specific 
opinions concerning certain issues, corporations have to accept that there will be people with different 
opinions that will take distance from such statements. As consumers are becoming increasingly fragmented, 
this is an evaluation issue, why Arla should identify the core stakeholders and opinion leaders and 
continuously stay true to them. These core stakeholders should be those which are of most importance for 
Arla in respect to vision, strategy, profit, market share and image.   
In the case of Arla we think they should have the Scandinavian values in their identity, and specifically listen 
to what the Scandinavian and British consumers expect from Arla. The reason for this is that Arla is a 
Scandinavian corporation and its main markets are in Scandinavia. If this is done properly, even in a crisis, 
we think that Arla would benefit in perceived image in the eyes of the Western minded consumers if they 
publicly take a stand to certain issues. This will increase the emotional connection to Arla, which will be 
associated with a kind of ambassador for Scandinavian values. However, by taking specific stands will of 
course also be a threat, as consumers who do not sympathies with Scandinavian values will have a relatively 
negative perceived image of Arla.  
 
If Arla decides to play more on their Scandinavian origin they will benefit by improving their image in 
countries where Scandinavian values are appreciated. On the other hand, as we are living in a globalized 
world with individual values and norms, Arla’s marketers has to adapt to the local market. Here the concept 
of identity consistency and diversity comes into the picture. Arla has the option to adapt to various markets 
as long as they don’t undermine the values of their corporate identity. By this we mean that Arla can adapt to 
individual markets as long as they do not go to far from the corporate identity, and in questionable situations 
the core corporate identity should prevail. It is possible to down play some parts of its identity, if it will be 
perceived as negative in certain markets. However, the corporation have to be consequent if these 
fundamental values are questioned, and they have to take a stand, even if it will cost market shares. As part 
of this it has to be noted that Arla never will be able to entirely hide its relation to its Scandinavian roots. 
This is also why we consequently have argued that it is better to stand even harder on this relation and 
thereby the associated values. 
 
We would even argue that if a corporation builds a strong corporate identity, it makes crisis situations 
relatively easier to approach, as the corporate identity sets the boundaries of what can be done. In other 
words, they know how to respond to satisfy its main and most important stakeholders and simultaneously are 
able to stay consistent in respect to its identity which is important for the brand to be trustworthy. Arla will 
send out a signal of being authentic in a situation where they express their believes, rather than, if the 
Scandinavian consumers felt as if they had to force the information out of Arla. As successful corporate 
branding build upon a shared set of coherent statement about values over time, this is essential to stress in the 
case of Arla. Arla should therefore rather identify their core values and constantly communicate those, and 
thereby be able to create bonds with the stakeholders, than constantly change their perspective and tell the 
various stakeholders what they want to hear. Sure this will disappoint some stakeholders, but it will also lead 
to a much stronger identity, from which the various stakeholders will be more likely to create a coherent 
perception of the corporate brand, which for some will be even more positive. Such consistent behaviour is 
the only way that brands can create a strong and desired differentiation, which in the case of Arla obviously 
has been lacking. This is essential as brands increasingly are working as signs, in order to signal certain 
individual created meaning.    
 
It has to be stressed that these recommendations are strictly seen from an image perspective. Corporations 
have to consider variables as economical loss and long term survival. This means that the recommendations 
above concerning how Arla should act internationally are highly important for Arla to be aware of in respect 
to the image consequences, however, we are aware that as crises are highly different of nature it is 
impossible to put a finger on how to act in all situations. But we believe that the trend in business is moving 
towards more authentic corporations which are increasingly dependent on relationships to primary 
stakeholders. This means that a corporation should actively and self motivated express their opinions about 
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various issues concerning their identity, which will strengthen its identity and thereby its image. By doing so, 
stakeholders will perceive the corporation as having a true identity with personal and authentic opinions. 
This therefore also means that long terms success increasingly is linked to a coherently strong brand image. 
Therefore we will recommend Arla to communicate their identity more clearly. In crisis literature, it was 
discussed how a person is judged by how he is responding to crisis, and how this can be related to business.  
This is also related to Arla’s present market situation, where they increasingly are faced with price 
competition on their primary markets. Therefore we also find that an increased focus on corporate branding 
as discussed above, and as also mentioned by Arla, will lead to a stronger strategic position on these markets. 
Moreover as they have a strategy of expanding internationally, a strong brand focus becomes even more 
predominately as the risk for international crisis likewise rises. We agree with this as corporate branding is 
becoming increasingly significant and thereby corporations will be put to the test to show how committed 
they are to these values. If the corporation fails to stay true to its values due to temporary pressure, we 
believe that the corporation will lose in the long run. Consistency in corporate branding is essential in 
today’s markets, but may even be of even higher importance in the future to come. 
 
#! '	
Arla decided to take further strategic actions on March19th 2006. At this time Arla had been under pressure 
by the Middle Eastern boycott for approximate two months. By the use of local newspapers Arla wanted to 
re-establish the trust of the Middle Eastern consumers. The ads which Arla published in the Middle East 
stated that Arla took distance from the drawings of the prophet Muhammad. Further, the ads expressed 
sympathy with the Muslim society, by stressing that Arla understands and respect the reaction which has lead 
to the boycott. (See appendix 1)  
Arla’s intention with the ads was to communicate to the individual consumer in the Middle East. Arla 
stresses how important it is to establish communication between parties and express opinions regarding the 
focal issue, if they want a chance to re-enter the Middle Eastern market, and get people to buy Arla’s 
products. (Politiken 2006e) 
  
However, Arla’s attempt to ease down the conflict in he Middle East was not well received by everybody. 
Two of the most influential parties in the Danish politics took distance from the ad brought by Arla. The 
parties were accusing Arla of letting the Danish values of freedom of speech down, and are calling the 
publication a sorry action for the angry Muslims. (Berlingske 2006b) The ads especially evoked anger 
among women organisations in Denmark, who argues that the ad is indirectly supporting how women is 
treated in the Middle East when Arla expresses sympathy and understanding for the Muslim standpoint 
(Politiken 2006f). Furthermore the majority of the Danish population said that Arla was letting down in the 
fight for the freedom of speech (Berlingske 2006c).  
On April the 6th, Arla announced that the boycott is slowly opening up, and that 3,000 stores had decided to 
put Arla’s products back on the shelves. Furthermore, Arla received confirmation from 31 of it main 
costumers in Saudi Arabia, that they would have their product back in their stores in few days. Arla was very 
satisfied with the situation in Saudi Arabia, and they expect that the rest of the Middle East will follow their 
lead.  
 
The reaction from the consumers and supermarkets who are selling Arla’s products again, is currently 
positive, but Arla are conscious that many Arabic consumers will be sceptical towards their products. As a 
way to regain the trust from the Middle Eastern consumers Arla have decided to change their marketing 
strategy, and intend to sponsor humanitarian projects in the Middle Eastern region, to help handicapped 
children, cancer patients and people in hunger. Moreover, Arla is dedicated to support activities which can 
help to create better understanding between religion and cultures. 
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7 Conclusion 
From the end spring new beginnings 
-Pliny the Elder 
 
 
Surrogate boycott is not a new phenomenon, however societal and business changes have brought it closer to 
the global corporations. Nevertheless, it still remains an extraordinary event for business management. It 
shows how companies increasingly are being drawn into the political and societal spheres and how 
vulnerable they can be for such external developments.  
Surrogate boycotts can hit every corporation without notice and with a critical impact. Compared to other 
boycotts it does not happen because of any controversial corporate behaviour or policy, but purely due to 
association relationships to third part political entities. In this way corporations can unsuspectingly be drawn 
into a fierce political debate and draw a lot of undesirable attention with strong and potentially long-lasting 
effects related to both economy and image.   
 
This however, does not mean that corporations should not expect a surrogate boycott, simply because they 
behave in accordance with the surrounding environment and have good relations with important 
stakeholders. Rather every global corporation should expect that a surrogate boycott can happen to them, no 
matter of their business practices. Therefore, corporations should prepare themselves for such critical events 
in order to tackle an upcoming surrogate boycott in a conscious manner with instant actions.          
Therefore it is essential that corporations have a strong identity, which is reflected in their most important 
stakeholders. This will help corporations in order to act fast and effectively in such upcoming crisis, and 
most importantly doing so in a consistent way. Additionally superior customer value and strong emotional 
linkages can help corporations to stand stronger and thus increase the potential cost for potential boycotters. 
This is the only way such upcoming crisis pressure can be reduced.  
 
Arla’s expensive lesson in the Muhammad crisis have illustrated that it is essential to tackle the situation 
consciously with basis in the primary stakeholders. It is vital not to loose track of the corporations own 
identity during such process in order to remain consistent and appear true. Therefore, any actions taken 
should be based on the corporate identity and put in relation to the primary stakeholders. Opposed to acting 
opportunistic and impulsive, a well planned strategy which encourages to dialogue can help to the 
corporation out of the crisis in an, under the circumstances, desirable way. Such strategy should be chosen 
based on the boycott pressure in the shape of image pressure, economic pressure and the boycotters 
commitment, which should be related to the sacrifice the corporations has to take in order to influence the 
policy which has led to the surrogate boycott. By not staying true and consistent with respect to brand 
identity increases the risk of loosing ones most important stakeholders. 
 
Surrogate boycotts should not necessarily be seen purely as a negative thing with damage minimizations as 
the only objective. Rather such crisis is a good opportunity to strengthen and target the brand. Arla would 
have had an excellent opportunity to strengthen their brand under the Muhammad crisis by acting more 
conscious, determined and coherently. This could from a long term perspective have helped them to appear 
more in line with their strategic visions as being a strong social responsible and Scandinavian brand.   
This is a very important conclusion as corporations can be tempted to act short-sighted due to the instant and 
critical characteristics of surrogate boycotts. The latest development and reactions to Arla’s advertising 
campaign in the Middle East has shown strong opposition and critique from their vital Danish market. Here 
Arla has lost the sympathy from important stakeholders, which they originally had due to the crisis. As the 
crisis is slowly ebbing away, Arla seem to have created an even weaker and more negative image on the 
Danish market.  
Time will show if the cost of accommodating the Middle Eastern stakeholders at the expense of the Danish 
were too high! 
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Arla Foods has distanced itself from cartoons 
 
Statement from Arla Foods 
 
Arla Foods believes that it is our duty to convey our opinion about the unfortunate events of recent 
months. We will also set out our position for the conference for International Support for the 
Prophet in Bahrain from March 22-23, 2006, to clarify where we stand. 
Arla Foods has distanced itself from the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten’s actions in publishing 
drawings of the Prophet Mohammed. We do not agree with the newspaper’s reasons for 
publication. 
 
On the backdrop of our 40 year history in the Middle East and as an active and integral part of 
society here, we understand why you feel insulted. Our presence in the region has given us an 
insight into your culture and values and about Islam. This understanding has, over many years, 
enabled us to supply high quality products which meet your preferences. Through your confidence 
in our products, we have succeeded in building up brands such as Lurpak, Puck, The Three Cows 
and Dano. Therefore, we understand and respect your reactions that have led to a boycott of our 
products following the Danish newspaper’s irresponsible and unfortunate action. 
 
We would also like to take this opportunity to give you some important information about our 
company. Arla is a Danish-Swedish co-operative which is owned by farmers. Our business in the 
Middle East has attracted investors and business partners from across the Arab world. Arla 
employs around 1,000 Muslims in the Arab and Islamic world as well as more than 250 Muslims in 
Europe. They have all felt insulted by these cartoons. However, Arla’s business in the Middle East 
has been affected not by its own actions, but because of the actions of others. 
 
Esteemed citizens, the years that we have spent in your world have taught us that justice and 
tolerance are fundamental values in Islam. We wish to co-operate with Islamic organisations to find 
a solution to the boycott of Arla’s products. We would simply ask you to reflect on this in the hope 
that you will reconsider your attitude to our company. 
 
Now you know more about who we are, about our attitudes and beliefs. We leave the rest to you. 
 
Arla Foods 
 
 
Source: Arla (2006m) 
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DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETS  
 
Turnover in  
mill. DKK 
01.10.03
30.09.04
30.09.02
30.09.03
01.10.01
29.09.02
02.10.00
30.09.01
 
Denmark 9.126 9.650 9.353 9.248
 
Sweden 10.345 10.216 10.281 10.062
 
Rest of EU-countries 21.632 13.694 12.960 12.396
 
Rest of Europe 566 885 770 782
 
The Middle East 2.435 2.628 2.445 2.103
 
Northen America 1.082 1.030 1.018 928
 
Middle- and South America 
 
567 707
 
871
 
932
 
Asia 
 
1.170 1.248
 
1.264
 
1.225
 
Africa 
 
625 561
 
457
 
430
 
Rest 
 
61 28
 
22
 
27
 
Total 
 
47.608 40.647
 
39.441
 
38.133
Source: Arla (2006n) 
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Table 1: Jylland-Posten published, in the autumn, the drawings of the prophet Muhammad in the newspaper. The drawings have 
since been criticised and discussed in several Muslim Countries. Do you think that Jyllands Posten should make an apology to the 
Muslim countries and to those living in Denmark, as a consequence of publishing the drawings?  
 Percentage 
Yes 31% 
No 62% 
Do not know 7% 
Total 100% (579 respondents) 
 
Table 2: several Muslim countries have criticised the Danish Government, by them not taking distance from the drawings published 
by Jyllands-Posten. Should the Prime Minister, according to you, make an apology on behalf of Denmark to the Muslim countries 
and those living in Denmark? 
 Percentage 
Yes 18% 
No 79% 
Do not know 3% 
Total 100% (579 respondents) 
 
Table 3: Why should the Prime Minister apology? 
 Percentage 
Because Danish industry is suffering 21% 
Because many Muslims feel degraded 32% 
Because it damages the perception of Denmark in the Muslim countries 26% 
Because of increased terror threat 19% 
Other reasons 2% 
Total 100% (132 respondents) 
 
Table 4: Which of the following statements do you primarily agree with? 
 Percentage 
It is acceptable for Jyllands-Posten to publish the drawings of Muhammad, 
and I do not understand the critique of the Muslims 
 
20% 
Jyllands-Posten has the right to publish the drawings of Muhammad, 
however, I understand the critique of the Muslims 
 
58% 
Jyllands-Posten should not have published the drawings in the newspaper 22% 
Total 100 (577 respondents) 
 
Table 6: As a result of the drawings of Muhammad, Danish goods have been listed on the boycott list of Saudi Arabia. How should 
the prime minister act in respect to this? 
 Percentage 
The Prime Minister should, due to export interest apologies to the Muslim 
world  
8% 
The Prime Minister should try to explain the Danish interest, by example 
having a meeting with the ambassadors of the Muslim countries  
 
44% 
The Prime Minister should not apologies to the Muslim countries, as this 
would be a wrongful political intervention of the principle of freedom of 
speech. 
 
48% 
Total 100% (577 respondents) 
Source: DR (2006h)  
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Source: Arla (2006l)  
 
